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Abstract 
 
Historians of the American Revolution have celebrated Boston’s role in early 
resistance to Britain, while neglecting its post-1776 history. After the British 
evacuation, pre-existing social and economic problems re-emerged in 1776-77. 
Trying circumstances caused patriot unity to collapse. The issues of army enlistment 
and price regulation revealed different ideas among the elite and the laboring classes 
about the people’s obligations to the American cause. The result was elite patriots 
moving the public discourse around patriotism in a direction that suited their interests 
and ensured their positions of power. They accused those who disagreed of a lack of 
virtue and remaining loyal to Britain. This thesis shows how, for Boston, the 
Revolution was not a solution. 	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Introduction 
 
‘Friends! Brethren! Countrymen!...the hour of Destruction or manly Opposition 
to the Machinations of Tyranny stares you in the face.’ So declared the handbill 
calling a Boston town meeting on 29 November 1773. The East India Company’s tea 
had arrived in Boston Harbor, and the people were to meet to decide how to 
respond. The ‘whole body of the people’, not just voters, were invited, and all sorts 
attended. Several thousand people gathered for the two-day meeting. Together, 
elites and laborers, merchants and artisans, all voted to have the tea ships guarded 
by the militia, censured Royal Governor Thomas Hutchinson, ordered the ships’ 
owners to send the tea back from where it came, and applauded when merchant 
John Rowe asked ‘Whether a little Salt Water would not do [the tea] good…’ The 
meeting seemed to represent the height of a unified patriot resistance. All came 
together in opposition to the perceived tyranny of Britain.1 
 
On 24 July 1777, another in a run of food riots broke out in Boston. A number 
of well-to-do women confronted Thomas Boylston, a noted merchant and, according 
to the British in 1775, a ‘dangerous patriot.’ The women knew he had a supply of 
coffee that he was not selling. They wanted to buy it at a price they considered 
reasonable and sell it on to poor people in their own small shops. Boylston refused to 
sell the coffee, and the women went away. However, at around three o’clock the 
same afternoon, a much larger crowd of women, possibly over a hundred, accosted 
Boylston at a warehouse. Once again they demanded he sell his coffee at a 
reasonable price. Boylston again refused. The crowd seized him, ‘tossd’ him into a 
cart, and drove him down the wharf to another warehouse where they demanded his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Dirk Hoerder, Crowd Action in Revolutionary Massachusetts, 1765-1780 (New York: 
Academic Press, 1977). 
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keys. The women opened the warehouse and took the coffee they wanted, promising 
all the while they would still pay for the goods.2  
This was not the only food riot in Boston in 1777. Boylston was now considered 
a Tory and worthy of derision. Less than four years after they had united in 
opposition to Britain’s Tea Act, Boston patriots were attacking each other over 
necessities. What had changed? 
 
The story of Boston from 1765 to 1775 has received a lot of attention from 
historians. Whatever interpretation one puts on the origins of the American 
Revolution, Boston will almost certainly feature. Its resistance to the Stamp Act and 
the Townshend Acts was so fierce the British sent an occupying army into Boston in 
1768. This in turn led to famous Revolutionary events like the Boston Massacre, the 
Tea Party, and the Siege of Boston. The town was also the home of many of the 
Revolution’s famous figures- John and Sam Adams, John Hancock, Paul Revere- 
and most prominent villains- Thomas Hutchinson and those thousands of British 
soldiers. It led much of the resistance movement through its Committee of 
Correspondence, a form of extralegal government that spread throughout 
Massachusetts. Finally, there was the Boston Tea Party and the Coercive Acts, the 
catalyst that helped turn American resistance into the American Revolution.3 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Abigail Adams to John Adams, 31 July 1777, in C. James Taylor, ed., Founding Families: 
Digital Editions of the Papers of the Winthrops and the Adamses (Boston: Massachusetts 
Historical Society, 2007), 
http://www.masshist.org/publications/apde/portia.php?id=AFC02d237, accessed 20 
September 2013; Gary B. Nash, The Unknown American Revolution: The Unruly Birth of 
Democracy and the Struggle to Create America (New York: Viking Penguin, 2006), p. 232. 
Despite this story, and relying heavily on the writings of another woman, Abigail Adams, a 
dearth of sources means that unfortunately women’s responses to events in Boston in this 
period are not prominent in this thesis. For the role of women in Boston in the Revolution pre-
1776, see Alfred F. Young, Liberty Tree: Ordinary People and the American Revolution (New 
York: New York University Press, 2006), pp. 100–43. 
3  For a specific focus on Boston, see Gary B. Nash, The Urban Crucible: Social Change, 
Political Consciousness, and the Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1979); Hoerder, Crowd Action; Richard Archer, As 
If an Enemy's Country: The British Occupation of Boston and the Origins of the Revolution 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Richard D. Brown, Revolutionary Politics in 
Massachusetts: The Boston Committee of Correspondence and the Towns, 1772-1774 
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However, Boston’s post-1776 history, after the end of the siege and the 
evacuation of the town by the British, has been largely overlooked. Superficially, this 
is understandable; the Revolutionary War and its aftermath were centered 
elsewhere. Those who have dealt with its post-1776 travails have either looked at the 
town as part of a broader region, or only concentrated on particular aspects of its 
history.4 Yet comprehending Boston’s wartime story beyond the siege is important for 
two reasons: first, it provides a vital context to its significant role in the 1763–76 
period; secondly, it offers an example of how the unity of American patriots began to 
collapse when, in the process of constructing a new political order amidst economic 
difficulties, it became clear that patriots had very different ideas about the meaning of 
patriotism.  
 
The lack of research into Boston is also symptomatic of a wider problem in 
scholarship of the Revolutionary period (1763–89): a relative dearth of research into 
the Revolutionary War. Partly, this is a result of the dominant interpretations of the 
conflict. So-called ‘Whig’ historians have been especially prevalent in scholarship; 
they see the core of the Revolution as being the expressed ideas and beliefs of the 
political leaders of the Founding era. This has led many historians to focus on the 
development of the intellectual beliefs and formal politics that made these leaders 
Revolutionaries, and culminated in the creation of the United States Constitution. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970); John W. Tyler, Smugglers and 
Patriots: Boston Merchants and the Advent of the American Revolution (Boston: Northeastern 
University Press, 1986); Benjamin L. Carp, Defiance of the Patriots : The Boston Tea Party & 
the Making of America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010). For a broader focus on the 
origins of the Revolution, see Pauline Maier, From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial 
Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to Britain, 1765–1776 (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1972); Edmund S. Morgan, and Helen M. Morgan, The Stamp Act Crisis : 
Prologue to Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1953); Peter D. G. 
Thomas, The Townshend Duties Crisis : The Second Phase of the American Revolution, 
1767-1773 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); T. H. Breen, American Insurgents, 
American Patriots: The Revolution of the People (New York: Hill and Wang, 2010).  
4 Hoerder, Crowd Action; Barbara Clark Smith, The Freedoms We Lost: Consent and 
Resistance in Revolutionary America (New York: The New Press, 2010); Jacqueline Barbara 
Carr, After the Siege: A Social History of Boston, 1775–1800 (Boston: Northeastern 
University Publisher, 2005). 
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However, Whigs have largely chosen to skip the Revolutionary War because they 
see it as irrelevant to this story. As John Shy has commented, these historians wish 
to separate the ‘constructive’ story of political revolution and the ‘destructive’ story of 
the war.5 The food riot that I opened with, and its context, has not received much 
attention from these historians.6 
‘Progressive’ historians see the core energy of the Revolution as coming from 
the beliefs and actions of non-elite Americans, whether they were laborers, slaves or 
Native Americans. They have argued that non-elites were at the centre of most of the 
actual action of the Revolutionary period; therefore, their motivations are key to the 
conflict. Progressive narratives tend to be more localised because there were a wide 
variety of non-elite groups who had diverse experiences in the Revolution.7 The 
importance of the Revolutionary War to non-elites has meant Progressives have 
focused more on the conflict than Whigs. However, Progressives have tended to 
research events in certain hotspots, particularly Pennsylvania8, Virginia9 and New 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 John W. Shy, A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for 
American Independence (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990), p. 119. 
6 For major works of Whig historians, see: Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the 
American Revolution (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1967); Maier, 
Resistance to Revolution; Edmund S. Morgan, The Birth of the Republic, 1763–89 (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1956); Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American 
Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1992). As the dates of these books suggest, the Whig 
interpretation as been set in stone for several decades.  
7 The nature of Progressive interpretations means they are less welcoming to major works of 
unifying synthesis. The primary example is Nash, The Unknown American Revolution. See 
also: Edward Countryman, The American Revolution (New York: Hill and Wang, 1985). For 
prominent monographs, see the following footnotes. 
8 Terry Bouton, Taming Democracy: "The People," the Founders, and the Troubled Ending of 
the American Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Benjamin H. Irvin, Clothed 
in Robes of Sovereignty: The Continental Congress and the People out of Doors (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011); Steven Rosswurm, Arms, Country, and Class: The 
Philadelphia Militia and "Lower Sort" During the American Revolution, 1775–1783 (New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1987). 
9 Michael A. McDonnell, The Politics of War: Race, Class, & Conflict in Revolutionary Virginia 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007); Also apparent in the fact that three of 
the six chapters about the War period concern Virginia, and one more concern events on its 
borders, in Alfred F. Young, Gary B. Nash, and Ray Raphael, eds., Revolutionary Founders: 
Rebels, Radicals, and Reformers in the Making of the Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
2011). 
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York.10 Their appeal is obvious; the laboring classes were heavily involved in 
Pennsylvania politics; Virginia had the largest slave population in America; the British 
army occupied New York for seven years. Yet in order to come to terms with the 
totality of non-elite experience in the Revolutionary War, more places need to be 
studied. This will give historians a greater understanding of what different people 
believed the Revolution meant; who controlled the Revolution on a local level; and 
how America did, and did not, change during the Founding period. Considering its 
importance to resistance to Britain leading up to 1776, no place seems riper for study 
than Boston.  
 
This thesis will study Boston from the end of the American siege of the town on 
18 March 1776 to the close of 1777. I have focused narrowly on this short period in 
order to examine the core issues of army mobilization and price regulation in close 
detail. The discourse around these issues was crucial for Boston patriots; in just 
twenty-one months, the celebrated unity of the town crumbled in the face of trying 
economic circumstances. This was also the part of the war where the military conflict 
remained somewhat close to Boston, and there was still a perceived threat of British 
reinvasion; this added urgency and panic to public discourse. In response to 
disagreements, elite patriots began to redefine the meaning of patriotism to suit their 
interests, abandoning the concerns of the laboring classes. This was an important 
turning point in Boston, reflecting the direction of the Revolution more broadly.11 
There are several major source groups that can be drawn upon to reconstruct 
Boston’s history in this period. The first are the records of the Boston town meetings; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Ruma Chopra, Unnatural Rebellion: Loyalists in New York City (Charlottesville: Unversity of 
Virginia Press, 2011); Edward Countryman, A People in Revolution: The American Revolution 
and Political Society in New York, 1760–1790 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1981); Phillip Papas, That Ever Loyal Island: Staten Island and the American 
Revolution (New York: New York University Press, 2007); Judith Van Buskirk, Generous 
Enemies: Patriots and Loyalists in Revolutionary New York (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2002).  
11 See particularly, Bouton, Taming Democracy; Nash, Unknown American Revolution; Smith, 
Freedoms We Lost. 
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in this celebrated system, Boston males with sufficient property could vote on a wide 
variety of matters concerning the town’s governance. The records provide insight into 
the issues that occupied the people’s attention, caused internal conflict, and what 
decisions were made to address them. It was, however, a forum only for those who 
had sufficient property; that is, for the elite and some of the middle sort.12  
This was also probably true of Boston’s two major newspapers, The Boston 
Gazette and The Independent Chronicle, which are my second major source set.13 
Newspapers were how patriots communicated their cause to the public.14 In 
investigating Boston’s public sphere I was of course influenced by the work of 
Benedict Anderson, but also Michael Warner. Warner has detailed how American 
print culture created a common public discourse through which political ideas were 
dispersed in the Revolutionary period.15 Anderson and Warner show how the 
newspapers are useful for providing insight into the ideas that dominated Boston’s 
public discourse, and how changes in that discourse reflect changes in Boston’s 
politics. 
For anecdotal evidence of events in Boston, I primarily relied on the 
correspondence of John and Abigail Adams. The two constantly wrote letters to each 
other, and a number of friends and family in Massachusetts. Many valuable details 
about occurrences in Boston can be derived from these writings. However, the 
authors are all wealthy patriots and many of them had a particular distaste for the 
common inhabitants of Boston. Yet using the techniques of ethnography pioneered 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Nash, Urban Crucible, p. 273; Young, Liberty Tree, p. 44. 
13 Uriel Heyd, Reading Newspapers: Press and Public in Eighteenth-Century Britain and 
America (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 2012). 
14 Stephen Botein, 'Printers and the American Revolution', in The Press & the American 
Revolution, ed. by Bernard Bailyn and John B. Hench (Worcestor: American Antiquarian 
Society, 1980), pp. 11–57; Richard Buel Jr., 'Freedom of the Press in Revolutionary America: 
The Evolution of Libertarianism, 1760–1820', in The Press & the American Revolution, ed. by 
Bernard Bailyn and John B. Hench (Worcestor: American Antiquarian Society, 1980), pp. 59–
97. 
15 Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread 
of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983); Michael Warner, The Letters of the Republic: 
Publication and the Public Sphere in Eighteenth-Century America (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1990). 
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by Clifford Geertz and introduced to studies of the Revolution by Rhys Isaac, 
significant evidence of laboring class actions and motivations can be mined from 
these letters.16 I was also particularly helped in constructing a picture of non-elite 
Bostonians by Alfred F. Young’s biography of George Robert Twelves Hewes, a 
Bostonian shoemaker whose life story was recorded because of his involvement in 
the Boston Tea Party.17  
 
Careful study of these sources reveals a markedly different picture of 
Revolutionary Boston than studies focused on pre-war resistance. On 18 March 
1776, the British army evacuated Boston, ending the first campaign of the 
Revolutionary War. The American forces reclaimed the city, and the town 
government began to function soon after. Yet there was to be no quick return to 
normalcy. Most of the population had fled the town in the early months of the siege; 
many did not return. The town had suffered significant physical damage in the 
previous year, and reconstruction was not a quick process. Though figures on its 
economy during this period are not available, the end of trade with Britain certainly 
harmed the port town’s business activity. Anecdotal evidence suggests the poor 
suffered particularly badly during the two years after the siege. Goods were 
constantly in short supply due to the cutoff of trade with Britain and demands from 
the military. This alone would have made prices high; what made them even worse 
was the Massachusetts government’s financing of the war through the printing of 
money.  
Boston had been a divided town before the conflict with Britain; there was a 
major, and growing, gap between the rich and poor. An elite class of merchants and 
politicians benefitted from increased involvement in the Atlantic economy, while 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures : Selected Essays (London: Fontana, 1993); 
Rhys Isaac, The Transformation of Virginia, 1740–1790 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1982). 
17 Alfred F. Young, The Shoemaker and the Tea Party: Memory and the American Revolution 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1999). 
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laboring Bostonians were hit hard by its fluctuations. My research suggests that the 
resistance movement against Britain temporarily united the town against a common 
enemy; Parliament’s attempts at taxation antagonised all classes. The strength of the 
town’s resistance to the British compelled leading patriots to expect it would remain a 
bastion of patriotism even after the British had evacuated.  
But the trying circumstances of the post-siege years tempered the laboring 
classes’ patriotism. For non-elites, patriotism primarily meant a commitment to family 
and community. They first displayed this in their unenthusiastic response to calls for 
increased enlistment into the Continental Army. It seems likely many laboring 
Bostonians briefly served in the army when they were evacuated from the town 
during the siege. Their experiences were not pleasant, and many felt they owed no 
more than a few months service. When there was another call for soldiers in 1776, 
and it was clear they would have to serve further from home, few were keen to enlist. 
This response alarmed elite patriots. For them, a fall in enlistments was a sign 
of the common people’s lack of virtue. This was a concept important to many elites 
due to the influence of classical republicanism. Elites believed that without virtuous 
citizens, the Revolution, and a new republican government, could be led astray by 
self-interest and harmful ideas. As the people with the most to lose from the failure of 
the Revolution, this alarmed them. The concept of virtue made them particularly 
sensitive to internal disagreements, and exacerbated distrust of the laboring classes. 
During this same period, elite patriots were also starting to see disagreements 
among themselves expressed in town meetings and the newspapers. Patriot unity 
not only cracked along class lines; elites had different ideas on what was needed to 
revive Boston and stabilise the newly independent Massachusetts. These internal 
disagreements, brought on by ‘external’ challenges to their control of the situation, 
only heightened elite alarm.  
The result of these two developments was a change in the tone of public 
sphere discussion in early 1777. Initially at least, patriots filled the newspapers with 
	   12	  
attacks on Bostonians’ lack of virtue and their lack of commitment to the patriot 
cause. But soon, more explicit links were drawn between the selfish and the ‘timid’, 
and ‘Tories’. This rhetorical move was an attempt to achieve two aims: firstly, to 
create a more concrete definition of patriotism, on elite terms; and secondly, to 
recreate the British enemy that had united Boston patriots in the years prior to 1776. 
This discourse became increasingly panicked over the first half of 1777 as patriots 
worried that Toryism was gaining traction amongst the common people, and that the 
British were going to reinvade the town. 
However, another issue arose in early 1777 that further illustrated the divisions 
within the town. Continuing price rises led to ever-greater suffering in the town, and 
food riots broke out around Massachusetts. In response, the Massachusetts General 
Court, or House of Representatives, attempted to regulate prices. Belief in economic 
justice led most of the population, elite and non-elite, to conclude that merchants and 
farmers were deliberately charging higher prices. Many believed that prices the result 
of decisions made by people rather than market forces. Laboring Bostonians, 
invested in community wellbeing, held these beliefs passionately, as evidenced in the 
mobs who attacked merchants who continued to set unfair prices after a Regulating 
Act was passed.  
But political elites increasingly began to sympathise with merchants of their 
class. Increased involvement in the Atlantic economy had led to a drift amongst 
merchants toward a belief in free trade and individual economic rights. In early 1777, 
elite patriots had framed economic justice as patriotic; setting unfair prices and 
withholding goods from market was evidence of Toryism. However, soon elites saw 
that the Regulating Act did not work, and that it led to increased crowd action by the 
laboring classes. This made them fear, again, that the Revolution might collapse. In 
response, they began to reframe patriotism in public discourse as a claim to rights to 
trade freely. The meaning of the Revolution was changed to suit the interests of the 
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elite. Eventually, the legislature repealed the Regulating Act was repealed, despite 
the sufferings of the laboring classes. 
 
Underneath the apparent unity celebrated by many historians, then, Boston 
was a deeply divided town. During the Revolution, these divisions manifested 
themselves as a debate about the obligations and meaning of patriotism. The town’s 
story is an example of how a revolutionary people at war wrestled with the meaning 
of their Revolution. Particularly significant in these years was how elite patriots began 
to redefine the conflict in ways that suited their interests, but abandoned the 
concerns of the laboring classes. To deflect concerns about the direction they 
pushed the Revolution in, they constructed an ‘other’ in the form of Toryism in public 
discourse. This legitimized their views and undermined their opponents. Boston 
shows why the war years are key to understanding the political and social 
development of the United States. Comprehending the issues of these years allows a 
more complicated and richer portrait of the American Revolution to emerge. But most 
of all, the story of Boston in these years provides a rejoinder to its supposedly 
triumphant story of the 1763–76 period. Revolution had not been a cure for its social 
and economic problems. 
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Chapter One 
‘If the storm should again burst upon this quarter…’ 
 
Boston faced serious social tensions and economic difficulties after the British 
evacuation in early 1776. These problems defined Boston in the two years after the 
siege. Yet the town’s woes pre-dated 1776 by several decades. Its economy had 
been stagnant for much of the mid-eighteenth century, and this had resulted in a 
major divide between elites and non-elites. In order to understand events in Boston in 
1776-1777, we need to investigate the town’s history in the last decades of the 
colonial era. 
 
The Decline of Boston 
For most of the first-half of the eighteenth century, Boston was one of the major 
towns of the American colonies. As the biggest port of the area, it was the primary 
connection between the expanding hinterland of New England and the rest of the 
world. Its import-export market thrived off this connection; those in the countryside 
sent in grain, cattle and lumber, while the surrounding coast supplied fish. In return, 
Boston merchants brought the rest of New England the goods of Scotland, Ireland, 
Holland, the Caribbean, and especially England. As the overall population of New 
England tripled from 1690 to 1740, so did Boston’s. This growth supported the 
artisans of the town in the construction industries. The town was also home to a 
flourishing shipbuilding industry, which prospered on the back of English wars in the 
early eighteenth century.1 
But Boston’s prominence did not last. In the 1740s, the town went into a 
decline it could not pull itself out of for decades. This fallow period began with the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Gary B. Nash, The Urban Crucible: Social Change, Political Consciousness, and the Origins 
of the American Revolution (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1979), pp. 
54–60, 111–2; John J. McCusker, and Russell R. Menard, The Economy of British America, 
1607–1789 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1985), pp. 91–111, 320. 
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major losses of life the town suffered in the Anglo-Spanish and Anglo-French Wars 
from 1739 to 1748.2 The town provided a larger proportion of its men for military 
service than did the rest of Massachusetts, and lost at least 400 of them.3 Boston’s 
casualty rates in these two wars, in percentage terms, were worse than they would 
be during both the Revolution and the Civil War. These losses increased the number 
of widows in the town to 1,200, almost all of whom had dependent children and were 
in need of local government assistance.4 To pay for the care of these women, the 
town had to raise taxes at the very moment when the number of taxable inhabitants 
was falling. New taxes were also put in place to pay for the war expeditions 
themselves. At the same time, the Massachusetts currency was on the decline. This 
hit the artisans of Boston very hard, leading some of the middling sort to leave the 
town.5 In the decade from 1742 to 1752, Boston’s population fell from 17,000 to 
under 16,000.6 
The end of war in 1748 also brought a predictable recession as military 
contracts for local industries tapered off.7 This led to a serious decline in the 
shipbuilding industry; in the next forty years, the industry did not achieve the 
production levels it managed during the first half of the eighteenth century.8 More 
middling artisans, in particular, fell on hard times. The town soon experienced a 
vicious circle, as poverty forced taxes up, which caused yet more middling artisans 
economic difficulties and to also require assistance.9 On top of this, a serious small 
pox epidemic hit the town in 1752, and there was an increased risk of laborers being 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Nash, Urban Cruicible, pp. 171–3; Carl Bridenbaugh, Cities in Revolt: Urban Life in America, 
1743–1776 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), pp. 47–9. 
3 Nash, Urban Crucible, pp. 171–3. 
4 Ibid., p. 182. 
5 Ibid., pp. 173–5, 184; Bridenbaugh, Cities in Revolt, pp. 47–9. 
6 Nash, Urban Crucible, p. 184. 
7 Ibid., p. 183. 
8 Bridenbaugh, Cities in Revolt, p. 73; Nash, Urban Crucible, p. 182; Jacqueline Barbara Carr, 
'A Change “as Remarkable as the Revolution Itself”: Boston Demographics, 1780–1800', The 
New England Quarterly 73, no. 4 (December 2000), p. 587. 
9 Nash, Urban Crucible, p. 183; Marc Egnal, New World Economies: The Growth of the 
Thirteen Colonies and Early Canada (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 72. 
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impressed into the British navy in this period.10 The town became less attractive to 
potential migrants, meaning it did not benefit from the population increases other 
prominent towns like New York and Philadelphia experienced in the mid-eighteenth 
century.11 
Wealth disparity was growing, and other occurrences only exacerbated this. 
When attempts to help the town’s poor failed, the town’s wealthier people began to 
blame the poor for their own poverty and offer less assistance.12 Meanwhile, the 
religious revivals of the 1740s, sometimes called The Great Awakening, were 
particularly potent amongst Boston’s lower classes.13 This further encouraged the 
fracturing of the community, as the wealthy of Boston rejected the egalitarian 
message of preachers like George Whitefield, while laboring Bostonians embraced 
these views. 
The state of the town was only to get worse in the 1750s. The Seven Years’ 
War had an even greater impact on Boston than King George’s Wars had. Nearly 
every laboring class male in Boston was to serve in the conflict at some point; 10% of 
those who served, or around 300 men, died.14 When combining these losses with 
those suffered between 1739 and 1748, Boston had experienced, proportionally, the 
equivalent of two twentieth-century world wars within a single generation.15  
The war also encouraged a growing gap between the rich and poor. Wealthy 
merchants benefitted from increased international trade, but the instability of this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Nash, Urban Crucible, pp. 182–4; Bridenbaugh, Cities in Revolt, pp. 47, 129. 
11 Nash, Urban Crucible, p. 184; Egnal, New World Economies, p. 55; the town’s relative 
decline can also be partly seen in the amount of goods being exported from Boston. It 
experienced much slower rates of growth than both New York and Philadelphia in this area 
during the 1750s and 1760s, and had been surpassed by Philadelphia in thw 1760s. See 
McCusker and Menard, British America, p. 196. 
12 Nash, Urban Crucible, p. 187. 
13 Ibid., pp. 204–19; Thomas S. Kidd, The Great Awakening: The Roots of Evangelical 
Christianity in Colonial America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), pp. 84–7, 94–8, 
115, 117–21, 138–73. 
14 Bridenbaugh, Cities in Revolt, pp. 60–1; Nash, Urban Crucible, p. 245; Massachusetts as a 
whole spent more than any other colony fighting the Seven Years War, see Jack P. Greene, 
‘The Seven Years’ War and the American Revolution: The Causal Relationship Reconsidered’ 
(1980), quoted in Elmus Wicker, 'Colonial Monetary Standards Contrasted: Evidence from the 
Seven Years' War', The Journal of Economic History, 45, no. 4 (December 1985), p. 877. 
15 Nash, Urban Crucible, p. 245. 
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international market was hurting the town’s laboring classes. This gap in experience 
led to a difference in beliefs; many wealthy colonists became concerned with capital 
accumulation and believed that self-interest was not harmful. These were the early 
developments of what would now be called economic liberalism. Such beliefs were in 
opposition to longstanding laboring classes’ principals of community economic 
justice; non-elites believed that the well being of the community should always come 
before individual economic freedom. Actions considered greedy and self-interested 
could be the subject of mob justice. But Boston merchants found such beliefs were 
no longer relevant to their interests; the laboring classes suffered as a result. Hard 
times forced many citizens off the town voting rolls, meaning there was no political 
forum they could easily express their concerns; resentment grew.16 
Tensions within the town came to a head in the 1763 town elections. Internal 
conflict manifested itself in a battle between the ‘court party’ and the ‘popular party’. 
The court party, led by future Massachusetts colonial Governor Thomas Hutchinson 
and those around him, were open to ‘modern’ economic ideas but believed only the 
wealthy and educated should be trusted with the governance of the town. The 
common people were too passionate and anarchic; not surprisingly, the court party 
hated Boston’s town meeting system, where voters could express their ideas in a 
public forum. Most of the court party was Anglican and had connections, whether 
economic or familial, to Britain. Opposing the court party was the popular party, led at 
this time by James Otis. Their views were the precise opposite; they held on to fading 
concepts of economic justice, and argued for more democratic politics in order to 
ensure this justice. Supported by the common people, most of whom could not vote, 
the popular party were non-Anglican and of lower economic stations. However, its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Nash, Urban Crucible, pp. 257, 273, 281–2; one cause of this was high prices for 
necessities during the period, see Wicker, ‘Colonial Monetary Standards’, p. 879. This conflict 
between elites and the laboring classes over economic activity had recurred throughout the 
first half of the eighteenth century as well, see Barbara Clark Smith, The Freedoms We Lost: 
Consent and Resistance in Revolutionary America (New York: The New Press, 2010), pp. 
62–72. 
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members were still decidedly of the middle and upper ranks of Bostonian society. In 
the heated conflict of 1763, more people voted in town elections of officials and 
General Court representatives than even during the conflict with Britain in the 
following decade. This occurred despite the fact that so many had been pushed off 
the voting rolls in the 1750s. The results of the elections did not lead to the 
supremacy of either party; seething tensions remained. According to Gary Nash, the 
economic, social and political turmoil of the early 1760s left Boston a community ‘only 
in the geographical sense…in social terms Boston had become fragmented, unsure 
of itself, ridden with internecine animosities.’17 
 
With the town divided and facing economic strife, the British began their 
attempts to raise revenue through taxation of American trade. The Stamp Act of 1765 
began the pre-Revolutionary conflict in earnest. The fury of the townspeople, whether 
conservative or ‘radical’, was turned on to a common enemy: the representatives of 
the British Parliament in the colonial government. The tax on all business and legal 
transactions involving paper offended colonists for political and economic reasons, 
which were inextricably linked in their minds.18 For Boston’s merchants, lawyers and 
newspapermen, the Stamp Act represented an unjust intervention in the American 
colonies that would cut into their profits. Lacking a vote in Parliament, they could not 
even have a formal say in its creation; their lack of political rights deprived them of 
economic rights.19 For the laboring classes, the Act was potentially harmful to their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Nash, Urban Crucible, pp. 281–2; this conflict included James Otis’ infamous ‘Writs of 
assistance’ speech, brought into the legend of the American Revolution by John Adams, as 
an early indication of the development of the beliefs that led to the Revolution a few years 
later. See James M.  Farrell, 'The Writs of Assistance and Public Memory: John Adams and 
the Legacy of James Otis', The New England Quarterly, 79, no. 4 (December 2006), pp. 533-
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18 Nash, Urban Crucible pp. 316–8; John W. Tyler, Smugglers and Patriots: Boston 
Merchants and the Advent of the American Revolution (Boston: Northeastern University 
Press, 1986), p. 17; Alfred F. Young, Liberty Tree: Ordinary People and the American 
Revolution (New York: New York University Press, 2006), p. 46. 
19 Stephen Botein, ‘Printers and the American Revolution’, in Bernard Bailyn and John B. 
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standards of living and it was another affront to their belief in the primacy of fairness 
in the economy.20 The colonial government seemed to be enriching itself from the 
fruits of common people’s labor, while they grew poorer. The grievances Boston’s 
populace had against each other did not go away, but now they had an enemy they 
could all agree oppressed them. Internal fractures took a back seat for the time 
being.21 
Initially, the ‘better sort’ of Bostonians who were outraged by this British 
intervention in colonial affairs encouraged the fury of the crowd.22 In one instance, 
prominent Bostonians associated with the popular party helped set up effigies of 
British customs officials, who were supposed to enforce and collect the stamp tax, for 
the townspeople to burn.23 Yet soon these ‘liberal Whigs’, some of who were soon to 
be prominent revolutionaries, found that they could not control the crowd.24 They had 
encouraged the unleashing of the laboring classes’ fury, only to find they could not 
determine what it did from that point.25 An uneasy relationship between the mob and 
those who wanted to control the mob existed for the next ten years. Liberal Whigs 
endorsed their actions sometimes but always distanced themselves from direct acts 
of violence, even as they saw how they could not sustain their cause without the 
support of the mob.26 
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The Siege of Boston 
For the decade from 1765 to 1775, the American colonies’ conflict with Britain 
remained fundamentally the same. The colonists objected to unwarranted 
interference in colonial affairs and a lack of political rights; the British remained 
unmoved by their concerns and tried several more times to tax the colonists.27 
Boston was a centre of this unrest.28 The decade also brought the most tumultuous 
economic conditions the colonies had ever seen, which added more fuel to the fire.29 
For their troubles, the British sent an army to occupy Boston to keep control of the 
population. This only infuriated the people more, as soldiers now competed with 
laboring people for work and were a public nuisance.30 
After the seething conflict finally turned into a war with the Battles of Lexington 
and Concord on 17 April 1775, Boston became the home of the first major military 
campaign of the American Revolutionary War. The occupying British army was 
contained within Boston by Massachusetts’s militia forces, which surrounded the 
peninsula on which the town sat.31 The Siege of Boston had begun. 
During the early months of the war, there was a mass exodus of people from 
the town. From April to June, 10,000 people fled Boston to escape the siege, though 
a few loyalists from around Massachusetts sought refuge from persecution by 
migrating into the town.32 Not everyone was able to leave legally at this time; some, 
like shoemaker George Robert Hewes, were unable to get permits, and had to find 
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ways to escape.33 Others, like merchant John Rowe and Son of Liberty James Lovell, 
chose to stay in order to protect property.34 
The siege exacerbated problems in the town. Food prices soared as the 
American forces were effective in cutting off the British supply.35 Soon this became a 
serious problem for the poorest inhabitants of Boston. Disease, including smallpox, 
the most feared of all diseases, became prevalent.36 During the winter, houses of 
absent Bostonians were torn down for firewood. Other homes were damaged or 
destroyed by vandalizing, thieving British soldiers and desperate citizens. Natural 
disasters, such as storms and especially uncontained fires, also did serious 
damage.37 As conditions in the town worsened, order crumbled. The British army 
began exercising arbitrary punishment on the citizenry, particularly imprisoning 
people for extended periods on questionable charges in unsanitary conditions. Fifty 
percent of those taken prisoner during the summer of 1775 died as a result of the 
poor conditions. Those not imprisoned dealt with violence and verbal abuse.38 
The end came in March 1776, following extended cannonading by the newly 
formed Continental army, led by George Washington. This caused more extensive 
damage and fires, though no one was killed. Soon the British forces, led by General 
William Howe, agreed to evacuate the town without burning it to the ground. Despite 
this agreement, civil order in Boston completely collapsed in the final weeks of the 
occupation, as loyalists and British soldiers engaged in extensive looting. On 17 
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March, eleven months after it began, the Siege of Boston ended as the British 
soldiers and 900 Loyalists sailed out of the town.39 
 
Going Home? 
The evacuation of the British ended Boston’s direct military involvement in the 
Revolutionary War, but the damage it wrought lingered. The town’s population only 
reached 10,000 again in 1780.40 Those who had left had sought refuge in 
surrounding towns in Massachusetts. Many reconstructed their lives in their new 
homes and never returned.41 The damage done to the town meant many did not 
have homes or possessions to which they could return to anyway. Boston’s economy 
had been in a bad state pre-war, and it was only to worsen after the siege. Attempts 
to escape this economic malaise likely motivated many to take any opportunity they 
could to make a living elsewhere. On top of this, smallpox was only cleared from the 
town in September 1776.42  
Fear of the British reinvading may have also kept the population low. Even in 
the early weeks after the siege, people worried the town remained vulnerable. Abigail 
Adams wrote from nearby Braintree that she ‘[could not] help suspecting some 
design which we do not yet comprehend.’43 In the first town meeting post-siege a 
committee appointed to wait on George Washington was asked to ensure he leave 
four pieces of artillery in place for the continued defense of Boston.44 Mercy Otis 
Warren wrote to John Adams in early April that while there was a ‘temporary calm’ in 
the region, she feared that ‘if the storm should again burst upon this quarter…we 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Ibid., pp. 35–8. The fates of Loyalists who fled the colonies has been little explored; see 
Maya Jasanoff, 'The Other Side of Revolution: Loyalists in the British Empire', The William 
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shall be too destitute of skillful navigators, to oppose its fury with success.’45 This fear 
did not dissipate in the next two years. Some also suspected the British still had 
agents within the town ready to undermine the peoples’ loyalty to the patriot cause. A 
letter from ‘A Plain Countryman’ appeared in the Boston Gazette just one week after 
the end of the siege; this countryman viewed those who had stayed as self-interested 
and unwilling to make sacrifices for the patriot cause. Even worse, some were 
outright Tories who had not left with the British.46  
The town government found beginning to rebuild the town to be a great 
challenge. Getting so far as to estimate property damage from the siege did not 
happen until November 1776.47 But the town was also burdened by a large amount of 
debt, over £18,000 by the end of 1776, and there was no clear plan for paying this 
off.48 Most of the town’s money was spent caring for the poor; the lack of funds made 
this even harder than usual.49 
Attending a town meeting during this period would have drawn a citizen’s 
attention to just how many people had not returned to the town post-siege. Before 
April 1775, Dirk Hoerder’s work shows attendance of Boston town meetings rarely 
dropped below 500, and could, during times of crisis, be as high as 1,000 people. In 
the early months after the siege, the average attendance was only 200. Though 
highs of 500 were reached in early 1777, this was a peak, not a return to the pre-
siege average.50  
Yet some undoubtedly did return, most likely those who dealt with 
uncomfortable living conditions during the siege. People in the areas surrounding 
Boston opened their homes to refugees, meaning two or three extra families were in 	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many homes. Some were less fortunate, and were forced to wander the area in 
search of shelter.51 This likely contributed to weariness and a decline in enthusiasm 
for the patriot cause. Bostonian actions in the following two years may have thus 
been informed by these trying circumstances; protesting the British and fighting for 
the patriot cause was easier in one’s home, with one’s family and local community. 
Unsettling these fundamental parts of Bostonian’s lives did not turn them into 
loyalists, but might have tempered feelings about the Revolution in the coming years.  
 
Concerns about smallpox, the return of the populace, the poor, the town budget 
and reinvasion were prevalent throughout this period. However, they were treated 
apolitically; though they had a serious effect on the lives of Bostonians, they were not 
the sorts of issues that caused debate in town meetings or handwringing in 
newspapers. That was reserved for the problems of enlistment in the militia and the 
Continental army, and the high prices of necessities. In the process of these issues 
being dealt with, non-elites revealed the nuances of their patriotism; they were more 
concerned with family and community wellbeing than sacrifice for a wider cause.  
 
The Enlistment Drive 
During the American Revolutionary War, the American forces were made up of 
two groups. The first was the state militias, in which men would usually serve for no 
longer than three months at a time. The second was the standing Continental army 
formed over the course of 1775-1776, which did most of the fighting. In the view of 
many revolutionaries, an ideal America would never have had the latter. 
In colonial America, it was technically the case that all adult males were 
supposed to serve in the state militia.52 Relations with Native Americans had 
disintegrated in the seventeenth century; with the British not willing to send troops to 	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defend these distant and small colonies, militia service was supposed to help 
colonists take their defense, and offense, into their own hands.53 But natives had not 
been a problem for Boston for almost a century, as the eastern Massachusetts tribes 
had been wiped out or forced westward.54 The militia thus turned into a community 
gathering that was not taken tremendously seriously in eastern Massachusetts. 
Muster days were treated as excuses for festivities and heavy drinking.55 Despite the 
requirement that all males serve in the militia, in reality the lower sorts of people were 
excluded; it was an institution for the middling sort.56 
In the view of those who were ardent believers in republican virtue, the war 
should have been a time for the militia to shine.57 Citizen soldiers, drawn from all 
classes, would answer the call of duty and rise up against the tyranny of Britain. 
There would be no need for a permanent army; volunteers would fill the quota of 
soldiers required. For the first few months of the war, this was true.58 It was the militia 
who fought the British in the Battles of Lexington and Concord that opened the war, 
and who came from all over Massachusetts to besiege Boston.  
But the enthusiasm for voluntary service quickly died off when men confronted 
the reality of the military.59 Military discipline was strict; they faced the death penalty 
for desertion. This was a world away from the militia’s festive mustering. Soon 
middling militiamen were faced with being treated like men at the bottom of society. 
Traditionally, it was the poor who had done the fighting, and so the soldiers were 
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treated like men of low social status.60 A divide was quickly established between 
officers and their men, even though at the start of the war many were from the same 
class. Disillusionment spread when officers were given a pay rise in December 1775 
to cement this division.61 Poor treatment did not just come from officers; citizens also 
did not look on soldiers kindly. Patriotic service did not create social capital.62 
Physical conditions were trying too; the army was soon surrounded by smallpox, and 
many of these soldiers were not immune.63 General sanitary conditions in the area 
around Boston were poor; the mass exodus of people from the town meant the area 
held far more people than usual. A scarcity of provisions was immediately a problem 
in the army, and much of the military’s time was spent trying to secure sufficient 
amounts of food and wood. This brought the army into direct conflict with the citizens 
of the area.64 
At this stage of the war, lingering patriotic fervor and short service terms kept 
significant mutiny from occurring. Instead, men simply left en masse when their 
three-month service terms were up.65 Some farmers did not even wait that long; 
many of them left during harvest season. By the time the Siege of Boston ended in 
March 1776, an enlistment problem had begun to develop in Massachusetts. There is 
no indication that Boston was required to provide troops for the Continental army for 
the first year of the war, as the town government was inoperative during the Siege. 
But when the British evacuated, it was expected to provide soldiers like everybody 
else. 
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In and around Boston, low enlistments continued for the rest of the year. There 
were several reasons for this, aside from fears of injury or death.66 Firstly, it seems 
likely that many Bostonians, having been forced to flee from their homes due to the 
siege, joined the Continental army in the initial wave of enlistments at the beginning 
of the war. Supporting this conclusion is a survey of the town taken in June 1776 to 
determine how many of the town’s men were in the army. The results, reported in 
September, claimed that 1566 families were surveyed; from these, 535 men were 
enlisted in the Continental army, 206 in active service in the state militia and 166 in 
the Sea Service.67 The sea service consisted of those on privateering vessels; this 
was a form of legalized piracy allowed during war, where men could take vessels out 
to attack and steal from British ships that transported goods to the Caribbean.68 If we 
assume that each family with someone in the service had only one man serving at 
that time, then almost 60% of families already had a member enlisted in mid-1776. It 
is safe to assume that some families had already had people serve a three-month 
term and then return. This could mean that by the summer of 1776, almost all of 
Boston’s men, or at least those who had returned to the town by that point, had 
served some time in the military. The reason enlistments were disappointing in 1776 
may well have been that many men felt they had already served their time, found the 
experiencing less rewarding than they imagined, and returned home. The problem 
was, if the army was to rely on volunteers, the war required more sacrifice than 
Boston’s men felt they were required to give.  
Insight into the mindset of an average laboring class Bostonian at this time can 
be mined from Alfred Young’s biography of George Robert Twelves Hewes. Hewes is 
an example of someone who enlisted in the service, initially on a privateering vessel 
in 1776, out of a desire both to fight the British and profit from getting his hands on 
lucrative goods. As a lower class Bostonian who found his trade as a shoemaker 	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unsatisfying, he did not find serving in the army so unpleasant as to not voluntarily 
repeat the experience. After serving at sea in 1776, he served in the militia for one to 
three months in 1777, and again in 1778 and 1781; in 1779 he took a second seven-
and-a-half month privateering voyage. Hewes thus served more than the average 
Bostonian, but with a crucial condition; he did not enlist in the service until he had 
provided for his family. Hewes had moved his family out of Boston to Wrentham at 
the beginning of the siege. He himself had not been able to leave, and ended up 
escaping by boat in around July 1775. Then he made his way to Wrentham, and 
spent a year there before leaving to go to sea. He considered leaving his wife and 
four children a very difficult experience, but the possibility of major rewards through 
privateering motivated him to leave his family for several months.69 
Prioritising of family over country suggests another reason why enlistments 
declined in 1776. As discussed, most Bostonians moved their families to surrounding 
areas at the start of the siege. Being forced away from home also meant being 
moved away from a source of income for many. The easiest source of employment in 
the area for men would have been to join the army. For Bostonian men in 1775, 
serving the patriot cause and providing for their family overlapped completely. But a 
year later, they had the chance to move their families back to their permanent 
homes. They could recommence the work they usually did and escape the 
unexpectedly harsh, unrewarding conditions of military life. Men had a choice 
between two much vaunted virtues: providing for family or sacrificing for the state and 
perhaps now ‘country’. Many probably felt they had already done sufficient service for 
their country by spending a few months in the military, and now they believed it was 
time to return to providing for their families at closer quarters.70 
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Hewes’ pattern of service provides other insights into the mindset of laboring 
Bostonians. He was far from alone in being tempted by the promises of going on a 
privateering vessel. At a time when necessities were scarce and expensive, and the 
currency was weakening, privateering was a lucrative enterprise.71 Hence why 
Hewes twice went on voyages, though without much success. His service at sea is 
another indication of how the war was not just about serving the patriot cause for 
laboring Bostonians; it was, as Young says, also about a chance to take new 
opportunities for income. Considering the precarious state of Boston’s economy in 
the previous two decades, it is understandable why people like Hewes would find 
privateering so attractive. It was a potentially profitable way of serving Massachusetts 
and fighting the British. According to Hewes, privateering vessels also did not have 
military discipline, and there was less of an attempt to assert rank than in the army; 
he felt respected by his crewmates.72 Elites, on the other hand, disapproved of the 
practice. It was a sign of the greed of the people, suggesting they lacked virtue. For 
them the 166 people in the Sea Service did not count toward Boston’s contribution to 
the war, because those people were not fighting the British army directly.73 The belief 
that enlistments were low was thus partly a matter of differing perceptions. 
 
At this point in time, men in Massachusetts could not be drafted into the 
Continental army, but they could be drafted into the state militia for three months of 	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service. This was not a solution to the long-term viability of the American war effort, 
but it was a potential short-term fix. However, this posed serious problems in Boston 
as well, as a muster day shortly after the Declaration of Independence displayed.74 
Men needed to be drafted for service in Canada, where the Americans had recently 
begun an offensive. Work by historians studying other states suggests that soldiers 
were willing to volunteer to protect their home states at this time, but not to travel 
elsewhere to defend distant locations.75 It is not surprising then that Bostonians did 
not willingly sign up to go to Canada, and a draft executed. Those eligible to be 
drafted were made to assemble on Boston common, where men who had formed an 
Independent Company were told to guard the potential draftees to prevent them from 
leaving.76 This Independent Company was a separate entity from the militia and the 
Continental army; it was only open to wealthier Bostonians, and was known for its 
expensive uniforms, ostentatious mustering, and having a common fund to pay for 
substitutes and fines to prevent members from being drafted into actual service. 
William Cooper, merchant and town clerk, then informed the potential militiamen that 
either volunteers would step forward or every twenty-fifth man would be drafted. The 
men assembled resented the way they were treated as lesser individuals, and so 
promptly rioted. In a town meeting the following month, some men tried to have those 
who defied this draft fined so that a bounty, or payment for enlisting, could be given 
to those who volunteered to serve in Canada.77 After being passed by voters at the 
meeting on 29 August, it was repealed by voters at another meeting on 9 
September.78 A diverse mix of people could attend the town meetings, so that on one 
day the town could vote one way and then the following day vote the other. This was 	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not to be the last time this occurred. The affair again showed that poor treatment 
alienated laboring people from enlisting. 
 
The enlistment issue was not localised to Boston; it was proving troublesome in 
much of the colonies. George Washington quickly became insistent on having a 
standing army with soldiers enlisted for as long as possible. 79 As a result, over the 
course of 1776, all the states passed laws allowing soldiers to be enlisted for three 
years; Massachusetts joined them in October, following a request for fifteen 
battalions from Congress.80 This law was intended to make it easier for the army to 
have sufficient manpower, important at a time when the army was meant to be 
expanding. Despite the enlistment troubles throughout 1776, enlistment officers were 
incentivized, by the offer of commissions, to try to fill quotas by 1 December.81 To 
incite enlistments, there would be bounties offered. 
During this period, the gap between middling artisans and the ‘lower sort’ 
became clear. An unsuccessful petition prepared in a town meeting suggested the 
middle sort probably did not like the three-month drafts; the petition asked for them to 
be ended and replaced solely with three-year service terms. As artisans in a fragile 
economic situation, militia service meant the possibility of being taken away from 
their work or potentially having to pay multiple sums in order to send a substitute in 
their place.82 The militia would also likely pay less and be difficult and unsatisfying. 
Constantly dodging militia service would also not look especially patriotic. The middle 
sort may have felt that it was better to try to convince poorer Bostonians to take the 
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burden of service for the duration of the war, on the justification that such people 
would struggle to find other work at this time.  
However, it appears that in late 1776 and early 1777, the poor were not to be 
so easily swayed.83 The quota was not filled until May 1777. A little bit of extra 
economic incentive was not enough to overcome the reasons they had to stay away 
from the army: namely, concern for family, a desire to return to pre-war work, taking 
the more beneficial offer of privateering, and dislike of army conditions. The lower 
sort of Boston would have been further turned away by rumours that Massachusetts’ 
soldiers were returning without being paid.84 Furthermore, the currency continued to 
weaken and soldiers’ wages, already low, failed to keep up with inflation.85 Further 
economic and social turmoil resulted from the controversy over high prices and 
attempted price regulation, making the idea of leaving family even less appealing.86  
When it quickly became clear that enlistments were not going to be that easy, 
enlistment officers started pushing up the bounties.87 This did not have the immediate 
effect of filling quotas; instead, many laboring people realized they could play the 
enlistment officers off each other. Each town had to fill their own quota, and 
enlistment officers operated seemingly independently. Thus, laboring people could 
push bounties up by threatening to enlist in another town where they could get a 
better deal.88 This was not the only reason those who may have considered enlisting 
might have been motivated to stall. The Massachusetts General Court also started to 	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pass laws blatantly aimed at incentivizing poorer men to enlist; for example, they 
passed a law preventing men from being arrested for small debts if they joined the 
army.89 The reason Boston did not fill its quota until May was perhaps because 
laboring people saw a chance to take every pound they could from the army and 
government. But some undoubtedly remained uninterested in enlisting.  
 
In the end though, the town’s common enemy resolved the conflict. On 29 
April, John Adams sent a letter to James Bowdoin, which claimed that the British had 
sent an army of 13,000 men to attack Boston.90 Nathanael Greene seemed to 
confirm this claim in a letter to Adams on 2 May.91 It seems likely these were just two 
of several claims of British reinvasion; the Massachusetts General Court passed a 
resolve on 30 April, filled with language of alarm, calling for a draft to be done to fill 
the Continental army battalion quotas by 15 May.92 Rumours of this attack also set 
off a panic in Boston; a town meeting on 3 May talked of the ‘crisis’ at hand.93 The 
town attempted to secure soldiers to defend themselves; initially there was to be a 
draft in Rhode Island in order to raise soldiers to defend Boston, but the town 
rejected this in favour of their own draft. This was to be executed on 15 May, as 
ordered by the General Court, if its quota was not filled by that date.  
However, the town did not need to perform the draft, because its quota was 
filled ‘early’. The panic appears to have led to a strong enough surge in enlistments 
to fill the town’s quota and end the enlistment crisis. In the Boston Gazette of 19 May, 
Major General Heath published a message of congratulations to the town for filling its 	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quota earlier than much of the rest of Massachusetts.94 But the filling of the quota did 
not imply Boston’s men had found a strong feeling of patriotism, merely a fear that 
the survival of their homes, families and livelihoods was at stake. These were the 
same factors that inspired men to join the army at the start of the war, and the same 
reasons that fervor fell away in 1776. Though records of exactly how the quota was 
finally filled are not available, it is also possible that fear and desperation on the part 
of the town government led them to make promises of large bounties and shorter 
terms of service in order to ensure the quota was filled. A draft was likely feared by 
the town’s elite due to the previous difficulty of militia drafts and the town’s social 
unrest. This is evident from the fact that other parts of Massachusetts had not filled 
their quotas by August 1777, and a special resolve was passed in the General Court 
to force them to do so; the implication was that the unnamed towns had been 
unwilling to have drafts.95 
There were other demands for soldiers in Boston over the remainder of 1777, 
but these appear to have caused little controversy. However, Abigail Adams did 
allude to the methods by which quotas were filled as being unusual and ‘croocked.’96  
 
Price Regulation 
While the enlistment issue was a major concern, just as much, if not more, 
attention was paid to the high prices and scarcity of most goods during 1776-1777. 
Prices soared for a combination of reasons. The breakdown of relations with the 
British also meant a breakdown of trade; goods now only came from the Caribbean, 
not Europe, making prices for imports much higher. The war had disrupted 
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agricultural production by taking people away from farms; this raised the price of 
agricultural labour, already a field with high demand and short supply in 
Massachusetts. The war also meant the military demanded many goods, and 
frequently impressed them without paying. Perhaps most significant was the fact that 
state governments, unwilling to tax the people, were paying for the war by printing 
money. Naturally, this led to constant inflation.97 
Yet the reason prices were such a major issue in Boston went back to the pre-
Revolution conflict between wealthier merchants who had embraced Atlantic trade 
and a wider market economy, and the laboring classes who prioritised economic 
justice and community wellbeing. This was a feud between those who believed the 
market set prices, and those who believed individuals set prices and should be held 
accountable for the prices they set. Hence, when prices rose, much of the population 
took this as a sign that merchants and farmers were treating them unjustly. In 1776-
77, a significant number of the political elite also supported regulation, or felt 
pressured enough to enforce regulations with which they did not agree. This would 
change later in the war.98 
Barbara Clark Smith has argued that a belief in economic justice gained 
potency during this period because it became tied up with ideas of patriotism, and 
what patriots owed each other. For example, currency financing ‘acquired a particular 
meaning: the currency would circulate among a Patriot population already pledged to 
dealing with one another as neighbours and countrymen…With each transaction 
[Patriots] would reenact their commitment to independence and their trust in 
Revolutionary authorities.’99 Currency financing was not supposed to be a problem 
because patriots would treat each other fairly, and so prices would stay at an 
acceptable level. The problem with this interpretation of events was that when prices 
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rose, much of the population took this as an indisputable sign that merchants and 
farmers were lacking in sufficient community spirit and had become greedy.  
Smith argues this connection between patriotism and economic action was 
formed during the conflict with Britain in the previous decade. Through the Stamp 
Act, the Tea Act and the like, Parliament tried to alter and control how colonists 
conducted Atlantic trade, as well as more local transactions. The response of the 
colonists was nonimportation and non-consumption agreements; that is, colonists 
simply withdrew from the Atlantic market. This caused shortages, but colonists 
believed that all patriots, united in principles, would sacrifice personal gain for the 
wider community by not raising prices in response to these shortages. With these 
boycotts enacted multiple times from 1765 to 1775, this connection was pressed into 
the populace’s minds. It was not just a laboring class belief either; the patriot elite 
also largely supported this interpretation, although their belief was starting to wane by 
1774 as the crisis stretched on and boycotts hurt merchant business.100 Ordinary 
men and women did the policing of these boycotts, legitimising their action against 
what they considered unfair. Consequently when the laboring people of Boston saw 
prices that they considered unfair, they reacted publicly and loudly.101 
 
In 1776, high prices were an issue of concern, but not one that dominated 
public discourse. This was perhaps because such discourse was the domain of 
wealthier Bostonians who were not so quickly hurt by the constant weakening of 
Massachusetts’ currency. However, the correspondents of John Adams did note it on 
occasion. In May 1776, James Sullivan, a Massachusetts Superior Court judge, 
complained ‘public Virtue is almost Swallowed up in a desire of possessing paper 
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Currency…’102 It is unsurprising Sullivan saw this, considering that this was a time 
when it was becoming increasingly difficult for less wealthy Bostonians to pay for 
basic goods. Abigail Adams wrote in June 1776: ‘Every thing bears a very great 
price. The Merchant complains of the Farmer and the Farmer of the Merchant. Both 
are extravagant.’103 Merchants and farmers feuded because they were both blamed 
by the population for the high prices of goods; they in turn put the responsibility on 
each other.104 The Massachusetts General Court also passed a law declaring that 
almost no supplies were to be removed from the state, unless they were going to the 
army, from 25 June to 10 November.105 In its desperation, Massachusetts tried to 
hoard goods, a practice it would continue the following year.  
Bostonians became convinced that merchants and farmers were withholding 
goods from markets in order to drive up prices further. Many also believed that there 
were merchants who tried to eliminate all competition for their goods so that people 
would be forced to pay their price. These beliefs were evident in the way scarcity and 
high prices were dealt with in the town meetings of 1776. The issue first appeared in 
a meeting on 23 May, when a motion was passed that formed a three-person 
committee to prevent the ‘forestalling’ of the market and the monopolization of wood 
imported to the town ‘over water’.106 This committee did not appear again until 
October, when its purpose was expanded to preventing the forestalling of all 
‘Necessaries of Life’.107 The committee was asked to draft a By-Law against 	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forestalling, but the meeting’s attendants rejected it in a vote. Instead a new eight-
person committee was formed, with all-new members, and asked to consider a 
petition ‘of a Number of the Inhabitants’ on the forestalling of necessities. The 
committee reported back a month later, but they had few suggestions for how to 
prevent unreasonable prices. However, they also refused to name those accused of 
forestalling.108 The process combating high prices went through in the Boston town 
meetings in 1776 was to be the pattern when price regulation became an even 
greater issue in 1777. A large part of the population cared deeply about it and wanted 
something done; politicians tried to enforce lower prices, but could not find an 
effective legal method. They were unwilling to aggressively pursue the methods they 
did try, and prices did not fall, leading to a loss of enthusiasm for regulation.  
 
Circumstances soon made high prices and their regulation a major topic of 
public discussion. The establishment of three-year service terms in the Continental 
army in October 1776 was a part of this; it meant enlistment became an issue to be 
dealt with by the state and the ‘nation’. It could not only be handled on a community 
militia level.109 This meant soldiers could only be paid in wages, and not have their 
services exchanged for goods or produce. High prices would directly impact the war 
effort; if prices were not addressed, potential soldiers would be reluctant to serve, 
weakening the patriot cause. This perhaps motivated government actions in January 
1777. The turn away from military service as a way of serving the cause also made 
people look for other ways of being patriotic; the preexisting tradition of economic 
boycotts and policing prices naturally made the economy a focus.110 
High prices also caused hardship in other parts of Massachusetts; riots over 
food prices had already broken out in Longmeadow, southwest of Boston, and 
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Salem, a short distance northeast of Boston.111 Pressure was mounting, and people, 
frustrated by a lack of government response, threatened to take matters into their 
own hands. This was why the Massachusetts General Court passed ‘An Act to 
Prevent Monopoly and Oppression’ on 25 January 1777.112 It quickly became known 
as the Regulating Act, as it fixed prices for necessities. At this point, it certainly had 
widespread support in Boston and Massachusetts more generally. It represented an 
attempt to assert the authority of the state on this issue; government had been shown 
to be impotent when it tried to address high prices in the Boston town meetings. It 
needed some sort of legislation to enforce punishments. This act offered that, and 
would hopefully keep riots to a minimum.   
Signs of the problems to come were clear in the 6 February meeting that 
established the committee to help with the enforcement of the Regulating Act. As 
high prices were considered a threat to liberty and safety, responsibility for the 
enforcement of the Act was put on the Committee of Correspondence, Inspection 
and Safety. Yet the town did not trust the Boston CCIS to enforce the act itself; hence 
another committee consisting only of men ‘not in Trade’ was formed to ensure that 
those who defied the Regulating Act were punished.113 The Boston CCIS was a 
particularly elite committee, filled with established political figures; John Hancock and 
Sam Adams had recently been members.114 These were people with major economic 
interests in Boston, and thus middling voters considered them unlikely to punish men 
of their class with which they had preexisting relationships. Such suspicions would 
soon be proven correct. 
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Though much of the town lauded the act, it quickly became clear that it was not 
going to operate as desired. Rather than sell goods at the legal prices, merchants 
decided simply to not sell their goods at all. The aim appears to have been to wait out 
the act, in the hope that it would soon be repealed and regular economic activity 
could resume.115 It created an unpleasant atmosphere; on 8 February, Abigail Adams 
wrote to her husband John, ‘Nothing now but the regulating Bill engrosses their 
attention. The merchant scolds, the farmer growls, and every one seems wroth that 
he cannot grind his neighbor.’116 A month later the situation had become even worse: 
There is such a Cry for Bread in the Town of Boston as I 
suppose was never before Heard, and the Bakers deal out but 
a loaf a day to the largest families…In short since the late act 
there is very little selling. The meat that is carried to market is 
miserabley [sic] poor, and so little of it that many people say 
they were as well supplied in the Seige [sic]. I am asshamed 
[sic] of my Country men. The Merchant and farmer are both 
alike. Some there are who have virtue enough to adhere to it, 
but more who evade it.117 
 
The shortages that had caused hardship were now even more serious. Rather than 
uniting the people, the Act had only made divisions worse. To try to prevent people 
from selling Massachusetts’ goods to other states, the General Court had passed 
another resolve preventing any one from taking goods out of Massachusetts, unless 
they were going to the army.118 They had done this on 7 February, only a few days 
after passing the Regulating Act. It did not end the crisis, but did antagonize other 
states that had supported Massachusetts during its difficult crises of previous 
years.119 	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Merchants claimed the act was unfeasible because it hit their profits to such an 
extent that the risk of doing business was not worth the potential reward.120 Laboring 
Bostonians did not think the profits of merchants were relevant; the community was to 
come before the individual. The populace was not going to surrender easily in the 
fight against extortion. In a town meeting on 14 March, the committee intended to 
enforce the Regulating Act implored the CCIS to have the names of those who defied 
the act published in the town newspapers.121 The belief was that publically shaming 
merchants would make them sell goods at the legal prices. The CCIS, as tentative as 
the people feared, did not do this. It would also appear that most Bostonians did not 
trust the courts to enforce the act, because this option was never even discussed; it is 
possible Bostonians had the same fears about the elite status of the courts as they 
had about the CCIS. As a result, the people took the matter into their own hands 
through riots. 
At first, these riots were far from a merely lower sort affair. Though the very 
wealthiest distanced themselves from the events, there is substantial evidence that 
many relatively well-off Bostonians involved themselves in some of the early riots of 
1777. Two of them have received particular focus; the first is the April riot led by 
someone dressed as ‘Joyce Junior’, the lower class tailor who captured and executed 
English king Charles I in the English civil war of the previous century.122 Joyce was a 
popular symbol amongst laboring classes, for obvious reasons. Hence why someone 
posing as him, speculated to be prominent Boston merchant and CCIS-member John 
Winthrop, led a crowd who seized five merchants believed to be extortionists and 
carted them out of Boston. As discussed in the introduction, in July a crowd of women 
of the middling sort attacked Thomas Boylston until he agreed to sell them coffee at a 
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reasonable price.123 These events show that it was not just the poor who were willing 
to act against extortionists; this issue cut across social strata, uniting some even as 
they were divided over issues such as enlistments. In an echo of the Stamp Act riots, 
wealthier citizens may have wanted to direct the crowd’s rage in order to keep it in 
check and have it serve elite purposes; this might have been why Winthrop allegedly 
involved himself in the Joyce Jr. riot.124 
However, as the conflict stretched on, riots did start to become more obviously 
lower class in nature.125 As they became more frequent and spread around 
Massachusetts, and into other states like New York and Connecticut, they made 
wealthier Bostonians more and more nervous.126 Meanwhile, the Regulating Act 
continued to be ineffective in lowering prices. Without a strong government presence 
to enforce the act, there was little that could be done to stop sellers defying the 
regulation; angry mobs were not always available. Instead, prices remained high, 
goods remained scarce, and there was more and more social unrest in Boston.  
Abigail Adams wrote that by June 1777, many elite Bostonians had started to 
express dissatisfaction with the Regulating Act.127 In mid-1777, those arguing against 
the regulations expressed their views with frequency in both Boston newspapers. The 
writers made the prices of goods into solely an economic, apolitical issue. High prices 
were the result of a weak, inflated currency, high demand, and high cost of imports. It 
was not a matter of virtue or patriotism.128 Meanwhile, social unrest continued 
amongst the lower sort of Boston, and elsewhere in Massachusetts, and there was no 	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drop in prices.129 Eventually, a majority of the General Court repealed the act on 13 
October 1777.130 
Continued riots showed that the lower classes still held this issue close to heart, 
and had not changed their views on this issue; only elites had. This was not to be the 
end of the debate; another attempt at price fixing would occur in 1779, thanks to the 
continued demands of the middle and lower sorts, and the continued high prices.131 
But the issue had already shown that Boston’s different economic strata had different 
priorities, which alienated them from each other.  
 
Boston had dealt with severe economic strife in the final decades of the colonial 
era. This had been a key motivation for its resistance to the policies of the British 
government. But the British were not the sole source of the problems, and so getting 
rid of them did not end the town’s difficulties. In many ways, the Revolutionary 
struggle only worsened the town’s conditions; it caused serious property damage, 
lowered the population, and led to more social tensions and economic strife. 
Historians have not focused on Boston’s post-siege story; for Bostonians of the time, 
the struggle was far from over. 	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Chapter Two 
‘A Spirit of Avarice’1: The Meaning of Patriotism in the ‘Home’ of the 
Revolution 
 
'…at such a time ought not every thing that has even the most distant tendency to 
weaken union or to create animosity, to be viewed with the deepest sensations of 
horror and indignation?' 
 
– ‘A Country Soldier, in the Continental Army’, Independent Chronicle, 13 March 1777 
 
Boston’s public discourse in 1776-77 was dominated by tension amidst 
uncertainty. The town had been victorious over the British, but most inhabitants did 
not know what that meant in reality. It was a victory without immediate reward; 
instead it left Boston crumbling, physically and economically. This dispirited many of 
the people, who had had their homes and livelihoods destroyed. In this exhausted 
state, fearing that the town was on the verge of collapse, the rupture lines in the 
community reappeared and deepened.  
When the town had a common enemy in the form of the British, it was relatively 
easy for all views on the meaning of patriotism to be subsumed by the claim that it 
was primarily about the desire for ‘liberty’. In practice, desiring liberty meant wanting 
to overturn unjustified Acts of Parliament and remove the British army from Boston. 
Yet after the siege, the British had been removed and the town could shape itself in 
the form it desired. But people with different views no longer had a common goal to 
paper over their differences. Initially only disputes amongst elite patriots appeared in 
public discourse. However, soon it became clear the more significant divisions were 
between elite and non-elite Bostonians. These came to the fore in public sphere 
discussion of army service and price regulation. Bostonians had differing ideas about 	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what they owed their town, state and fledgling nation, if the latter meant anything to 
them at all. This made elites very nervous; with the Massachusetts Constitution not 
yet created, ideas about patriotism that gained supremacy could determine the 
character of the state for years to come, and the very survival of the Revolution. In 
response to these divisions, elites had a two-pronged strategy. Firstly, in early 1777 
they began to push their own views on patriotism very hard in town meetings and the 
newspapers. Secondly, they attempted to define views that did not suit their interests 
as Toryism. This was an endeavor to recreate the common enemy that had united 
Boston in the previous ten years, while ensuring the Revolution went in their 
preferred direction. However, at the same time elite patriots reconsidered their views 
on price regulation, resulting in an abrupt change in what was classified as Toryism. 
In the consideration of these issues in the public sphere, the town revealed again 
how fractured it had become; even a Revolution could not override the community’s 
differences. 
 
In May 1776, less than two months after the British had evacuated Boston, the 
friends and family of John Adams living in and around the town started to worry about 
its lack of spirit. Abigail Adams wrote on 7 May: ‘…the eyes of our Rulers have been 
closed and a Lethargy has seazd almost every Member. I fear a fatal Security has 
taken possession of them.’2 Clergyman Samuel Cooper agreed; he felt that those 
who had remained in the town during the Siege were low in spirit and that the ‘better’ 
citizens of Boston had not returned.3 Superior court judge and Massachusetts 
legislature representative James Sullivan was more damning when he stated what he 
believed was wrong with the town: ‘…such a Levelling Spirit prevails even in men 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Abigail Adams to John Adams, 7 May 1776, Founding Families 
http://www.masshist.org/publications/apde/portia.php?id=AFC01d262, accessed 7 September 
2013. 
3 Samuel Cooper to John Adams, 20 May 1776, Founding Families, 
http://www.masshist.org/publications/apde/portia.php?id=PJA04d100, accessed 7 September 
2013. 
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called first among the Mighty, that I fear we shall finally be obliged to call in a military 
force to do that which Civil Government was originally designed for.’4   
These three wealthy citizens of the area were coming to terms with 
townspeople that had been through significant trauma in the past year. They recalled 
when the ‘spirit of ‘73’ possessed Boston, and the people were, superficially at least, 
united in belief and purpose. Now instead the low morale and poor state of the town 
reminded them of the other side of the conflict with Britain; the inability of elite 
patriots to control the response of lower class crowds, and the fear of where this 
might lead. There was a concrete manifestation of this anxiety: the drafting of the 
Massachusetts Constitution, which would play a major role in determining the 
makeup and character of Boston’s political community. However, this anxiety did not 
lead elites to focus on the town’s poor physical and economic conditions. Instead, it 
was expressed through fears that the common people lacked virtue. 
 
For these three writers and other people of similar station, being a virtuous 
citizen meant a passionate dedication to America, a concern for the well being of the 
town over oneself, and a respect for the town’s leaders. But the most important 
characteristic of a virtuous citizen was their ability to be disinterested when they 
considered public affairs; to be able to put aside their own concerns and desires and 
work for the common good. Many historians have claimed America’s intellectuals 
derived this idea of virtue from their understanding of the republicanism of Ancient 
Rome and Greece.5 The concept of republican virtue was highly influential on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 James Sullivan to John Adams, 9 May 1776, Founding Families, 
http://www.masshist.org/publications/apde/portia.php?id=PJA04d090, accessed 7 September 
2013. 
5 For more on republicanism see Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American 
Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1992), pp. 95–168; Richard R. Beeman, 'Deference, 
Republicanism, and the Emergence of Popular Politics in Eighteenth-Century America', The 
William and Mary Quarterly, 49, no, 3 (July 1992), pp. 401–30; James T. Kloppenberg, 'The 
Virtues of Liberalism: Christianity, Republicanism, and Ethics in Early American Political 
Discourse', The Journal of American History, 74, no. 1 (June 1987), pp. 9–33. For a look at 
how this key concept developed amongst historians, see: Daniel T. Rodgers, 'Republicanism: 
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way the intellectual and political elite of Boston, and America at large, viewed political 
and economic matters during this period, but there is little indication that it had 
significant influence outside of a small circle.6 The reason for this was that republican 
virtue could only benefit and work for the elite that believed in its importance; this can 
be seen in a further examination of the idea of disinterestedness. Disinterestedness 
in dealing with public affairs could supposedly only be achieved by a person not 
being beholden to anyone else for their livelihood. In practice, this meant only people 
who owned property and derived their income from that property could be considered 
disinterested.7 Only the disinterested were truly fit to comment on public affairs; this 
was why in the conflict over the Massachusetts Constitution in the years that 
followed, the Bostonian elite continued to insist on property qualifications for voters 
and political representatives.8  
Republican virtue had provided elite patriots with the ideological foundation for 
their conflict with Britain; but their immersion in this belief system was problematic 
when dealing with laboring Bostonians in 1776. It was an idea that made elites place 
the onus for determining conditions in Boston on the will and character of the people. 
It was their responsibility to improve themselves morally, engage in self-sacrifice, 
defer to their disinterested superiors, and work hard in the hope of one day being a 
disinterested citizen. Adherence to the idea of republican virtue made elites unable to 
comprehend the way the major turmoil of the previous year had affected the priorities 
and concerns of laboring Bostonians. At a time of feared British reinvasion and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
The Career of a Concept', The Journal of American History, 79, no. 1 (June 1992), pp. 11–38. 
For recent attempts to modify republicanism, see Eric Nelson, 'Patriot Royalism: The Stuart 
Monarchy in American Political Thought, 1769–75', The William and Mary Quarterly, 68, no. 4 
(October 2011), pp. 533-72; Caroline Winterer, 'Model Empire, Lost City: Ancient Carthage 
and the Science of Politics in Revolutionary America', The William and Mary Quarterly, 67, no. 
1 (January 2010), pp. 3-30. 
6 Beeman, ‘Deference, Republicanism’ explains the impracticalities of republicanism, and why 
it never caught on outside a small circle of intellectuals. 
7 Wood, Radicalism, pp. 104–6. 
8 For more on the eventual outcome of the conflict over the Massachusetts Constitution, see 
Gary B. Nash, The Unknown American Revolution: The Unruly Birth of Democracy and the 
Struggle to Create America (New York: Viking Penguin, 2006), pp. 290–305.
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political reform, this perceived lack of virtue worried the elite deeply. Particularly 
telling is Sullivan’s comment that the army should be brought in to correct the 
population. Though Sullivan may have been making the remark somewhat flippantly, 
it is suggestive of the danger elites saw in a failure of virtue. 
 
Yet not every politically active citizen of Boston was a firm believer in 
republican virtue. At the same time that Sullivan, Cooper and Adams worried about 
the state of the town’s people, other voices weighed in and questioned 
Massachusetts’ political structures and leaders. Three essays appearing in the 
Boston newspapers illustrated these alternate ideas.  
The first of these essays appeared under the pseudonym Massachusettensis in 
the New England Chronicle.9 The writer saw the separate deliberations of the 
General Court and the State Council as ‘aping the two houses of parliament in the 
British constitution, which is a relick of the old feudal system, which was founded in 
injustice, and supported by lawless tyranny’.10 He wondered whether ‘acting 
separately…ha[d] not a direct tendency to breed ill-will and resentment’. 
Massachusettensis was also the first of several letter-writers to urge people to vote 
wisely in the then-approaching elections, for he feared the possibility of the 
Revolution going astray. 
Two more letters of similar tone and content appeared in the month of May; 
these were both in the Boston Gazette. In the 13 May edition, someone signing ‘One 
of Your Number’ echoed Massachusettensis’ worries about the representatives in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 It was not, however, Daniel Leonard, the Massachusetts Loyalist who had debated with 
John Adams about the American cause in 1774 under this pseudonym. He had left the 
country with the British at the end of the Siege, and would never have thought of writing 
something like the letter that appeared in the New England Chronicle of 2 May 1776. See 
Robert M. Calhoon, ‘Leonard, Daniel (1740–1829)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
Oxford University Press, 2004, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/68616, accessed 8 
Sept 2013. For Leonard’s letters and Adams’ responses, see John Adams, John Adams: 
Revolutionary Writings 1755–1775, ed. by Gordon S. Wood (New York: The Library of 
America, 2011), pp. 320–606. 
10 ‘Massachusettensis’, New England Chronicle, 2 May 1776.  
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General Court: ‘The greater the difficulties in which a people is involved, the more 
attention ought to be paid to the qualifications of those who are to compose the 
legislature.’11 The writer stated that ‘Every man who is a professed and sincere friend 
to his country is not qualified for a legislator.’ A person required natural and acquired 
abilities to fulfill such a role, and the members of the General Court did not meet this 
standard. ‘Demophilus’, in the 27 May edition of the Gazette, also called for the right 
people to be elected, but additionally feared the absence of good Patriots due to the 
demands of the war.12 He was also the first to express concern about accumulation 
of offices, implying there was danger in too much power being invested in individuals. 
Like Abigail Adams and company, these three writers were worried about the 
state of their town. The difference is that, though their worry remains virtue, it was the 
virtue of the political elite of Boston that was the issue, not the people at large. In the 
view of these writers, the condition of Boston, and Massachusetts, depended on the 
character of the leaders and the structures within which they worked. The people, 
through elections, needed to keep the virtue of leaders in check. It is not clear who 
these writers believed ‘the people’ to be; there was no discussion of the populace 
itself. However, their uniform failure to discuss changes to property qualifications as a 
potential reform of the political system suggests they did not see a problem in that 
part of Massachusetts’ political structures.13  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 ‘One of Your Number’, The Boston Gazette, 13 May 1776.  
12 ‘Demophilus’, The Boston Gazette, 27 May 1776.  
The use of classical pseudonyms has been argued by Eran Shalev to be connected to 
republicanism, suggesting that writers like Demophilus may not have embraced the particular 
form of republicanism proposed by John Adams and the like, but still wanted to connect their 
beliefs and actions to antiquity. See Eran Shalev, 'Ancient Masks, American Fathers: 
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the Early Republic, 23, no. 2 (June 2003), pp. 151–72. 
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by Nathan R. Perl-Rosenthal, 'The "Divine Right of Republics": Hebraic Republicanism and 
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13 This was a major issue throughout the colonies; see Nash, Unknown American Revolution, 
pp. 264–305. 
	   50	  
The reason these writers remained anonymous may have been because their 
views opened them to a charge of being ‘levelers’, a serious and damaging 
accusation in America at this time.14 Even though we do not know who these writers 
were, they indicate disagreements within the upper tiers of Boston society about what 
was most important to the town and state’s well being at this time. The presence of 
these disagreements in public forums may have added to the anxiety of the elite 
about conditions in Boston. At this crucial time, when the meaning of the Revolution 
was being determined as it was also being fought for, the ideas propagated might 
determine the very survival of the new political order the Revolution had created. In 
the back of elite patriots’ minds may have been the knowledge that the collapse of 
this new order could also have spelled the end of their lives; the British would 
presumably have prosecuted many of them for treason. 
 
The calls of Massachusettensis and company in early 1776 were not isolated. 
Over the course of 1776, Boston’s newspapers continued to feature essays and 
letters calling for changes to the structure of Massachusetts’ government. ‘A 
Watchman’ wrote a two-part essay in the Chronicle in June about the need for 
external defense, in the form of military defense of the town, and internal defense in 
the form of a constitution.15 What is unusual is that, to prevent internal tyranny, he 
also called for ‘EQUAL REPRESENTATION’ (author’s emphasis) of all the people of 
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calls for a unicameral legislature. At this time, a two-house legislature was seen as the ideal 
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Authority and Liberty: State Constitution Making in Revolutionary America (Chapel Hill: The 
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New England had a long history of accusations of leveling at any time when people tried to 
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Massachusetts and for paying legislators based on the productivity of their meetings. 
‘A’ in the 11 July edition of the same paper repeated the call for separation of the 
offices of the executive and legislature, but also openly outlined how the virtue of the 
elite affected the common people: ‘If rulers are not men of virtue, little care will be 
taken of the morals of a people; and if these are not attended to…we may be 
assured that ruin will inevitably attend the state.’16  
Direct discussion of the virtue of the common people appeared less frequently. 
Its only explicit appearance was in the 24 October edition of the renamed 
Independent Chronicle, when ‘A’ attacked the character of New Englanders for 
causing a shortage of salt. ‘It were to be wished that more social virtue prevailed 
amongst us; it would contribute greatly to lessen our distress.’17 In 1776 at least there 
was no other direct attack on the virtue of ordinary people in the newspapers. 
However, concerns about spirit and character of the common people consistently 
appeared in those who corresponded with John Adams throughout 1776, over issues 
such as privateering, lingering beliefs in reconciliation with the British, and 
education.18 
But the newspapers did give evidence of distrust of the patriotism of the 
common people. This paranoia was evident in the way so much attention was paid to 
minor infractions in and around Boston that were interpreted as illustrations of a lack 
of loyalty in some of the populace. A prominent example was a controversy over 
whether the town of Barnstable voted against Independence or only did not give its 
General Court representatives instruction on the matter. This occurrence in a small 
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17 ‘A’, Independent Chronicle, 24 October 1776. The New England Chronicle changed its 
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18 James Warren to John Adams, 7 August 1776, Founding Families, 
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town 70 miles south of Boston was featured three times in three months, twice on the 
front page of the Gazette and once in the Chronicle.19. It was not the only time such 
minor incidents would receive attention.20 The focus on these sorts of minor events 
intimates the beginning of a line of thought that would become more prominent in 
1777. Part of the elite seemed to believe that all it might take was a few individuals of 
bad virtue and incorrect opinions to put the rest of the populace on a path that would 
bring down the patriot movement and prevent Boston from ever being improved. 
They were so worried about the potential for the town and state to be undermined 
that they were looking widely for the first domino. Such thinking aligned with some of 
the elite’s embrace of republican virtue; the philosophy made them worry about the 
judgment of the common people. Hence, they became paranoid about the 
appearance of any ‘dangerous’ ideas amongst non-elites because they feared their 
influence with people who lacked disinterestedness and passion for the cause. 
Considering that most in the public sphere were not trying to argue for an end to 
property qualifications, and the direction public discourse would soon take, it is likely 
wealthier Bostonians that were not outright republicans held similar views. However, 
Toryism was not much discussed at this time; this suggests that in mid-1776, patriots 
were not yet sure what cracks in consensus meant for the Revolution. Was it a sign 
of enemies among them, or disagreements to be expected amongst members of a 
movement? 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 The New England Chronicle, 11 July 1776; The Boston Gazette, 29 July 1776, 2 
September 1776. For more on Barnstable, see Robert Calhoon, The Loyalists in 
Revolutionary America 1760–1781 (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973), pp. 340–
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The town meetings were the one place where Bostonians’ conflicting 
viewpoints met, clashed, and left a record. Here there was a battle for power in 
Boston, with the middle sort siding with those who were suspicious of the political 
elite. Three clashes in 1776 all happened within several weeks of each other. They 
began in a meeting held over 26-27 August when there was a conflict, which three 
times led to ‘considerable’ debate, over the ability of some to hold multiple offices.21 
This issue came to the fore when the town was considering who should be elected to 
the Committee for Correspondence, Inspection and Safety. The dispute ended with 
the town voting that a person could not be both a member of the General Court and a 
member of the CCIS; holding a military office whilst being a CCIS member was also 
outlawed. Though the exact specifics of the debate are not available, it is likely there 
was a dispute because of the prominence of the members of Boston’s CCIS. It 
included people such as John Hancock and Sam Adams. These were the type of 
well-established politicians whose virtue had been questioned in the newspapers. 
Hence why voters would fight to prevent such people from holding multiple offices, 
which could cause a conflict of interest or simply invest too much power in one 
individual. Yet it is unlikely such powerful people as Hancock and Adams, General 
Court representatives both, would have accepted being deposed; particularly if they 
feared the character of the people was questionable. Nonetheless, they were in fact 
removed from the CCIS. It is possible this clash of viewpoints only added to elite 
concerns about where divisions in the town might lead.  
In a continuation of the same meeting on 28 August, there was another debate 
that reflected this same conflict.22 An article in the agenda asked the town ‘To 
consider of some effectual Measures to promote Order, & a Reformation of 
Manners.’ The wording of this article suggests whomever had it placed in the 	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  Boston Record Commissioners, Reports of the Record Commissioners of the City of 
Boston, Volume 18: Boston Town Records 1770–1777, (Boston: Rockwell and Churchhill, 
City Printers, 1887), pp. 241–2. 
22 Boston Record Commissioners, Boston Town Records, p. 243. 
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meeting’s warrant believed it was not the government that was causing problems in 
Boston’s society; it was the people, who needed to be corrected by their social 
betters– that is, those who held political office. A motion was put forth to have a 
committee appointed to consider this article, but this motion was not voted on 
because ‘having occasioned considerable Debate, it was the Sense of the Town, that 
the Question upon said Motion should not then be put.’ Much of the audience of the 
meeting likely took offense at this article due to it insinuating that they were all people 
of poor character who were destroying the fabric of Boston. Many Bostonians may 
have been worried about the abilities of their fellow townspeople, but such a public 
forum was not an appropriate place to scorn the majority of your fellow citizens, 
where everyone could easily learn who you were.  
The conflict was to play out a third time in September, in the first of many 
battles over the drafting of the Massachusetts Constitution.23 This was the issue with 
the greatest long-term implications for Massachusetts and Boston, yet the formula 
was the same. Conservative Bostonians, this time with the backing of the General 
Court, proposed drafting the Constitution with the State Council. Then, after being 
made public ‘for the Inspection & Perusal of the inhabitants’, the Assembly would 
ratify their own draft. Essentially, this was an attempt by the conservative elite of 
Massachusetts to keep the mass of the population out of the drafting of the 
Constitution. This suggests that the attitudes of the Bostonian republicans were 
widespread amongst people of their station throughout the state. The meeting 
unanimously rejected the proposal; considering that non-republicans had disliked 
politicians holding multiple offices for fear of them gaining too much power, it is 
unsurprising they did not like the idea of the same people determining the makeup of 
the state’s politics. 
Though the Boston town meetings were not welcoming to all non-elites, only 
those who had a certain amount of property, these three occurrences show they 	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were not a place where conservative republicans could simply force their own desires 
to be accepted by the town’s voters. Other Bostonians, elite and more middling, had 
their own ideas on how their town should operate at this time, and were successful 
enough at advocating those ideas that they could at the very least prevent their will 
from being ignored. The Bostonian republicans perhaps now understood why the 
British had so despised the town meetings and had tried to abolish them.24 
 
After a lull in discussion over December, divisions reemerged in January 1777, 
but with a distinctly different tone. To understand why this was, we have to return to 
the issue of enlistments in the army.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, October 1776 saw the beginning of an 
enlistment drive in Massachusetts and the creation of three-year service terms. The 
republican elite of Massachusetts considered enlistments to be an important gauge 
of the virtue of the people. It was, for some elite patriots, the most obvious way for 
‘lesser’ people to put aside their personal interests in the name of self-sacrifice, and 
thus prove themselves to be good republican citizens. As a result, the ability to fill the 
armies with volunteers, or citizen soldiers, was the first big test of the independent 
states’ capability to be a strong republic.  
A letter written by the five Massachusetts delegates to Congress in 1776 
displayed the republican belief in this connection between enlistments and virtue.25 
On 3 April the Massachusetts Delegates to Congress, John Hancock, John and Sam 
Adams, Robert Treat Paine and Elbridge Gerry, co-authored a letter sent to the 
Massachusetts State Council on the issue of enlistments in eastern Massachusetts. 
They initially praised all of eastern New England for discovering ‘the firmest 
Attachment to American Liberty and the warmest Zeal and Ardor in its Defence.’ 	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(capitalisation from source) But they immediately followed this with the warning that 
‘Should they at any Time fail in this or Neglect to supply their Quota’s of Men and 
Arms they must in Consequence hereof be the greatest Sufferers, and may Infer on 
themselves the Censure of the rest of the Continent.’ In early April 1776 though, the 
five delegates were willing to put the enlistment troubles down to the methods for 
establishing the army. However, the message was clear: if this continued, it would 
not be treated lightly. Occasional complaints about enlistments appeared in the rest 
of 1776, but elite outrage only really exploded at the beginning of 1777.26 This is 
likely because of the failure of the enlistment drive, which the General Court believed 
could be completed by 1 December. 
The Independent Chronicle for 2 January 1777 featured an essay titled ‘The Art 
of Toryism and the Dignity of Whigism,’ written by an ‘American.’27 The piece tried to 
establish black-and-white definitions for the two groups in question. Tories, in the 
writer’s view, came in three types: the selfish, who would ‘sacrifice every thing social 
and sacred to their mean selves’; ‘the timid, who have not spirit enough to hazard 
any thing in the cause of virtue’; and those who ‘delight in contradiction, and in 
opposing every popular opinion, especially in matters of religion and liberty.’ This 
American then went on to claim ‘A true Whig or Patriot, is uniform in his conduct, and 
by words and deeds constantly testifies his firm attachment to the cause of Liberty…’ 
Anyone who did not measure up to the precise standards of behavior expected of 
Whigs was to be considered an enemy; one was either with the Whigs or against 
them. Many Americans did not meet these standards, and these people could and 	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should be driven out so that true Whigs could ‘plant the standard of FREEDOM in 
every part of America.’ According to this writer, those who had previously been seen 
as merely lacking virtue were now to be labeled ‘Tories’ and be lumped in with truly 
nefarious individuals who had no desires except to undermine society.  
This American was far from alone in early 1777; both Boston newspapers 
suddenly overflowed with this same style of aggressive rhetoric. Attacks on the virtue 
of the people were much more prominent and aggressive; they were also more likely 
to come with accusations of Toryism. Attacks on the governance of Boston and 
Massachusetts disappeared. 
This change in the tone of the public sphere can be seen in the newspapers 
over the following five months. ‘The Spectator’, who wrote several essays appearing 
in the Gazette in January and February, drew a direct connection between 
moderates and enlistment problems:  
When an army is to be raised by order of Congress, or an act 
is made by the General Assembly, though every one 
confesses that the execution of it is necessary to the defence 
of the country, yet how many evasions and how much 
exercise of cunning are there to render it null, as if the people 
at large had no interest in the matter!28 
 
In this period there were also pieces in both papers urging people who had not joined 
the army to do so in order to share in the glory and contribute to the cause.29  
The Spectator and other writers claimed Tories in their midst were a threat 
because they might sway the more ‘timid’ amongst the populace to think about 
reconciliation with the British.30 The timid continued to be spoken of with great 
hostility, for if they were not already supporting the British their mere presence was 
destroying society, making them as bad as Tories. Another article entitled ‘Thoughts 
on the Times,’ also attributed to an ‘American,’ outright stated ‘He that loves himself 
more than his country, is an enemy wherever he lives, and ought to be banished 	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[from] human society.’31 A writer calling himself Oliver Cromwell blamed these men 
for all of the problems Boston and America at large were facing at this time, including 
problems in the army and the economy.32 He went as far to say these people, as they 
had ‘two tongues’ and were not men of spirit or principle, should not be allowed to 
vote in elections.  
While less extreme, both John and Abigail Adams had developed similarly low 
opinions of Boston by this time. John had gone home to Braintree for the winter, and 
had spent time in Boston during this period.33 In January 1777, when he travelled 
back to Philadelphia, he consistently compared Boston unfavourably to the other 
towns he visited. In Fish Kill on 18-19 January, he said ‘I don’t find one half of the 
Discontent, nor of the Terror here that I left in Massachusetts’; he found the 
population ‘Zealous against the Tories, who have not half the Tranquility here that 
they have in the Town of Boston…34’ In April, Abigail expressed similar opinions; ‘As 
to the Town of Boston I cannot give you any very agreeable account of it. It seems to 
be really destitute of the Choice Spirits which once inhabited it.’35 These echo her 
statements in 1776, but Abigail’s tone suggests she thinks even less of the town in 
1777. 
 
For the elite of Boston, the initial failure of the enlistment drive was a 
confirmation of their worst fears about the people. Their lack of virtue meant they 
could not be trusted to do their duty and give the sacrifice their new country needed; 
they had not just ruined Boston, they were ruining America at large as well. Even 	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elites of a less republican bent were dispirited by ‘proof’ that their underlying anxiety 
about their fellow Bostonians was well founded. This can be seen in the fact that 
attacks on governance disappeared during these months from both the newspapers 
and the town meetings. There was no consideration of the many good reasons for 
why people might not be so keen to serve; a lack of patriotism, which was proof of a 
lack of virtue, was the only explanation considered. 
Yet now people were not just lacking spirit or virtue; they might have been 
outright Tories. Tories were split into two groups: genuine Tories who were believed 
to be actively working to undermine the state; and those who simply lacked virtue. 
This latter group was now thought to be as harmful to society as Tories and could 
easily be convinced to become active Tories. There were reasons for the sudden fear 
of Toryism at the turn of 1777 aside from elite alarm at events in Boston. It may have 
been representative of a new confidence, developed in the months following the 
Declaration of Independence, in the strength of the new, revolutionary, post-British 
political order.36 Having declared where they stood in relation to Britain, patriot 
leaders now wanted to define the characteristics people of this new political order 
should have. As they wanted to create an ideal republican state full of virtuous 
citizens, a person lacking virtue was now considered to be working against the state, 
and therefore was thought to be able to slip into Toryism with ease. Distrust of the 
patriotism of the people meant those less committed to republicanism did not object 
to this hardline stance. 
But the rise in discussion of Toryism signified more than this. It was also a 
response to the breakdown of the ‘patriot consensus’, seen in differing views over the 
constitution, government, and virtue.37 Having been at the centre of unrest in the 
previous decade, Boston had also been one of the places where a split between pro-	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British and anti-British people had occurred most rapidly and with greatest force.38 
Bostonian patriots were able to ensure unity amongst their movement by having 
prominent opponents they could define themselves against, including government 
officials, conspicuous merchants and of course the occupying British army. Patriots 
frequently attacked their opponents, physically and verbally. Post-siege, however, 
they lacked these obvious local opponents they could define themselves in 
opposition to; consequently, anti-British sentiment could not override divisions within 
the patriot movement. Elite patriots were fearful that divisions could lead the 
Revolution in directions that did not suit their interests, such as increased laboring 
class participation in government. In response patriots in early 1777 tried to 
reconstruct the Tory enemy, and accused those who did not act in accordance with 
elite desires of Toryism. This was a way of delegitimising opposition and ensuring 
their own power. 
Where this particularly became clear was in the attempt to prosecute Tories 
through the town meetings. Because distrust focused on the common people, there 
was a greater sense of unity in the town meetings at this time. Prosecution of Tories 
began on 14 March with the formation of a committee ‘To consider what Steps are 
necessary to prevent the Inconvenience & Danger that may happen from persons 
resorting to, or residing in the town, who are justly suspected of being inimical to the 
American States.’39 The committee reported back that another committee of 12 
people, one for each of the town’s wards, should be formed to take the names of all 
the people who had come to live in Boston since 19 April 1775. The new committee 
was also asked to take the names of refugees and ‘other disaffected Persons’ who 
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were in the town, and what town they were from, if they are ‘justly suspected of being 
inimical to the States of America…’ 40 
The choice of the first day of the siege as the cutoff point was significant for two 
reasons. The practical reason it was chosen was because of the influx of Loyalists 
from around Massachusetts, who had sought safety with the British at the beginning 
of the siege. Many of these people had left with the British at the end of the siege, but 
as ‘A Plain Countryman’ had expressed back in April 1776 after the siege had just 
ended, a suspicion lingered that not all of the Loyalists had left. Yet the choice of the 
siege’s start date was also an attempt to retroactively assert the power of the newly 
independent Boston. As the day on which Britain and America finally became 
enemies at war with each other, 19 April 1775 was also the day those sympathetic to 
the British became dangerous enemies, even though the colonies did not declare 
independence until almost seventeen months later. At least some Bostonians now 
considered 19 April 1775 to be the day a new America began to come into being, and 
anyone who had been against this order in April 1775 had to be cast out for the good 
of Boston and America at large. Take away the outright Tories, and the moderates 
and the timid people in Boston could be swayed to ‘patriotism’ and ‘virtue’- at least, 
the elite definition of such things. A truly virtuous America could then emerge. 
Economic decline, property destruction, demoralizing experiences of war and several 
decades of tough times did not seem to be as important to the town’s state, in the 
eyes of those at this town meeting, as the evil Tory individuals allowed to dwell in 
Boston. 
This issue re-emerged in early May, when a belief that the British were about to 
attack led to a panicked attempt to specifically name the Tories in Boston and put 
them on trial. The committee established in March produced a list of twenty-nine 
supposed Tories.41 These people were, indeed, known to be loyal to Britain. Some 	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had defied nonimportation agreements, worked for the British in the previous decade, 
or did so at that point in time.42 A number had also signed an open letter in the New 
England Chronicle of 26 October 1775 mourning then-Massachusetts Royal 
Governor Gage’s passage to Britain.43 Yet they were hardly a threatening bunch; 
Mather Byles was a sick old man who, denied of his pastorship, lived on the charity 
of fellow loyalists.44 Benjmain Davis and his son, as well as William Jackson, had 
both tried to leave the town with the British at the end of the siege, but circumstances 
led both of them to end up back in Boston, penniless.45 They had already been 
imprisoned at the time of this meeting, as had William Perry and Patrick Wall.46 
Samuel Danforth and James Lloyd were allowed to remain in the town because they 
were medical doctors; Tories were still preferable to disease.47 It seems unlikely 
these men, many of them well into middle age, could have led any sort of rebellion. 
However, that was not the point for patriotic Bostonians; the words and very 
presence of these loyalists were potentially poisonous. They could sway the 
moderates and neutrals into supporting Britain again. The virtue of Bostonians was 
believed to be weak; it would not take much to push them back into the arms of 
Britain. 
Benjamin Edes also used his paper, The Boston Gazette, to attempt to reunify 
the patriot movement by means other than printing aggressive rhetoric. He twice 
gave significant room to pieces that tried to justify the patriot cause. One of these, 
written by ‘An Independent Whig’ spread across no less than seven issues of the 
Gazette from March to April 1777, taking up entire pages of a four-page 
newspaper.48 This Independent Whig used the writings of the former Massachusetts 
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Royal Governor Thomas Hutchinson to show that Hutchinson did have anti-American 
sentiment and so the rebellion against him was justified.49 The other piece following 
the same theme appeared in the midst of Hutchinson’s letters. Titled ‘A New 
Catechism’, it may have been written by Edes himself.50 In question and answer 
format, the basic facts of the war with Britain and the justification for it were laid out. It 
was essentially a simplified, direct version of what the ‘Independent Whig’ was trying 
to show. It positioned America as the victim of men launching a war of aggression, 
and America as only defending itself. The chief purpose of an offensive war, which 
the British were conducting, ‘for the most part, is to gratify the ambition of a tyrannic 
Prince, by subjecting to his arbitrary will a people whom God had created free…’ By 
contrast a defensive war, as America was at the time conducting, ‘is the taking up 
arms to resist tyrannic power, and bravely suffering present hardships and 
encountering present dangers, to secure lasting liberty, property and life, to future 
generations.’ Edes’ purpose in including these pieces was to redirect the hostility and 
anger felt by his readers back on to the British and away from fellow Bostonians. He 
was trying to contribute to the attempt to define the boundaries of the patriot 
movement, as the elites had been doing, but in a way that focused attention on the 
external enemies that all Bostonians shared, rather than on the ambiguities of the 
proclaimed standards of patriotism that were tearing Boston apart. By restating the 
cause of America clearly and directly in this way, Edes hoped to recapture the pre-
Siege unity of the town. Nonetheless, he continued to publish essays, articles and 
letters feeding the hostility of his fellow Bostonians. This is unsurprising; he was a 
businessman who had to please his readership, particularly in economically difficult 
times. 
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What sustained public sphere hostility for five months was the fact that the 
enlistment quota was not filled until May 1777. The virtue of the people may be 
lacking, but surely it would only take a small amount of incentive to coax them into 
service of the cause. But despite ever-increasing bounties, laws to prevent those who 
enlisted from being arrested for small debts, and promises of being able to keep 
whatever plunder was taken from the enemy, the quota was filled almost six months 
later than expected.51  
Abigail Adams, as well as Adams family friend and physician Cotton Tufts, 
reported multiple times with disappointment that enlistments were only coming along 
very slowly.52 James Warren complained that rather than simply enlist, many men 
were trying to push bounties as high as possible, slowing the filling of the quota.53 
John Adams himself was furious that the state that had experienced British tyranny 
so strongly was not committing itself to the fight. In April 1777, he wrote: “Every Man 
of the Massachusetts Quota ought to have been ready last December. And not one 
Man has yet arrived in the Field…”54 
But these worries also went deeper; having to establish a standing army 
already showed that the country would not be able to put their trust in citizen soldiers 
doing everything they could to fight the enemy. Trying to enlist men for three years, 	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and giving incentives like high bounties and being kept out of debtor prison, was an 
indication that the army tried to enlist those who had always done most of the fighting 
in colonial America: the poor.55 The political elite, and possibly much of the middling 
sort, likely thought that if they could not rely on the militia, they could always easily 
get the lowest of Boston society to fight for the army. This had been common practice 
in the past. This would have looked like a particularly straightforward option because 
plenty of evidence had been given in the previous decade, through their response to 
British oppression, that the lower sort of Bostonians had also developed a strong 
political consciousness. Combine patriotic feeling with a little bit more economic 
incentive, elites thought, and then, at a time of war and limited economic opportunity, 
surely the poor could easily be won over.  
The difficulty in winning over the poor agitated wealthier Bostonians. It made 
them wonder whether the war could actually be fought, and whether they needed to 
do more about Tories in case they were the ones talking the poor out of serving. 
More than this though, the enlistment difficulties made the elite fear the level of 
agency the lower sort were showing. At the same time that this was happening, 
Bostonians were beginning to riot over food prices and scarcity. Elites could not be 
sure the Revolution was not going to be led ‘astray’ and defeated. Hence, elite 
patriots continued to fill the newspapers with denunciations of Toryism; if they 
changed the discourse around patriotism, more would feel pressured into service. 
 
Discussion of government, including the forming of a Constitution, faded 
significantly in these months. The few mentions of the Constitution suggest that it 
remained an important issue to Boston patriots, but of lesser importance than the 
virtue of the people at that point in time. A writer using the pseudonym 
‘Phileleutherus’ proposed an extremely detailed draft for the Constitution in the 6 	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March edition of the Chronicle.56 This inspired a number of sharp reactions from 
people in Boston, including Abigail Adams and the Reverend William Gordon.57 The 
primary reason for why it proved so offensive to some is due to Phileleutherus’ 
suggestion that the executive branch be entirely subservient to the legislature; this 
idea offended republican elites like Adams and Gordon afraid of the uncontrollable 
will of the people. The reaction to Phileleutherus also suggests that, even when not 
talking about Tories or the army, public discourse in Boston had generally become 
more hostile at this point. Responding under the name ‘Philadelphus’ in the 17 April 
1777 edition of the Chronicle, a writer accuses Phileleutherus of being the ‘most 
designing and subtil enemy that America has in the Massachusetts.’58 This suggests 
how patriots also took a hard stance on what sort of governing structure was 
acceptable in their ideal America. 
 
There was an irony to the attempts of Boston’s patriot elite to declare a failure 
to enlist in the army as a failure of virtue and patriotism. In the same period, elites 
tried to redefine the significance of economic activity to the patriot movement. To see 
this, we have to return to the Regulating Act. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, a connection between prices and 
patriotism had been established by the conflicts with Britain in the previous decade. 
The wording of the Regulating Act confirmed this connection by saying it was 
necessary to secure the ‘liberties of America’.59 Newspaper essays also emphasised 
this connection, as seen in two pieces in the Chronicle of 13 February 1777, less 
than three weeks after the act had been passed. A letter from ‘Neither a Merchant 	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Nor a Farmer’ claimed that the act was good because it would show loyal patriots 
that setting high prices was doing ‘the drudgery of their enemies’, the Tories.60 
Understanding, thanks to the Regulating Act, that setting high prices was a threat to 
the liberties of America, merchants and farmers would set their prices at reasonable 
levels. The writer also blamed the Tories for setting the merchants and farmers 
against each other by spreading rumours amongst each that it was the other who 
was extorting the people. A letter signed by ‘Philo-patrie’ appeared directly under the 
piece by ‘Neither a Merchant Nor a Farmer’ and had the same subject.’61 However, 
this writer was unforgiving of those who opposed the act; ‘I am surprized to find that 
some amongst us, from whom better things might have been expected, oppose this 
salutary law, and thereby become enemies to their country.’ These two writers were 
trying to help quickly establish a patriot consensus on the issue of high prices with 
the passing of the Regulating Act; setting unfair prices in order to gain individual 
profit was now to be declared a Tory action. Those who had engaged in it before 
were mistaken; those who continued to engage in the act would be considered 
Tories. As with army enlistments, elite patriots were attempting to establish an 
unambiguous position on price regulation that was meant to clearly define who was a 
patriot and who was a Tory. Unlike the army enlistments issue, it is likely most in 
Boston would have agreed.  
The Boston town meeting endorsed this interpretation when the thirty-six-man 
committee intended to assist in the enforcement of the Regulating Act recommended 
that the town write letters to other towns assuring them that Boston would sell goods 
at prices set by the Act.62 These letters needed to be written in order ‘to prevent any 
Misunderstanding by false Reports spread by the Tory Party…’ This was a blatant 
attempt to make a belief in the primacy of fairness in economic activity, over 
unregulated freedom of action, a crucial part of being a patriot. However, establishing 	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a consensus was not so simple; the different beliefs amongst Bostonians about how 
the economy should operate were about to reemerge and come into direct conflict. 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, it soon became clear that the Regulating 
Act did not work without a substantial government infrastructure to enforce prices; 
instead it led to increasingly lower class riots. Merchants saw these events very 
differently from the lower sort, as outlined by merchant Isaac Smith Sr. to John 
Adams. Writing from Boston, Smith argued that he was already offering goods at only 
a 5% profit to himself, which he claimed was necessary ‘for doing business without 
any resque…A great many of the present House…thinks a person concernd in trade, 
what he has comes is all gains…’ The implication was that if he sold goods at the 
prices set by the General Court, he would be losing money. In Smith’s view, the 
reason the Regulating Act could not work in Massachusetts was that it needed to be 
enacted by Congress and apply to all the states. This was because merchants were 
buying goods from other states, and colonies, where there were no price limits, and 
then bringing them back to Massachusetts. This also meant transport costs, which 
could be variable, particular if merchants were importing goods from the Caribbean. 
People like Smith felt the price limits bore no relation to the realities of importing 
goods; unless the profit was reasonable, merchants believed it was not worth the risk 
and effort to try importing goods to the Massachusetts market. Decades of 
involvement in Atlantic trade and growing international capitalism had made beliefs in 
economic justice irrelevant and incomprehensible to some of Boston’s merchants. Yet 
it was not an option for Massachusetts to not have imports; the state was not self-
sufficient, and was in fact increasingly reliant on imports.63 Some merchants, aware of 
the demand for imports, continued to import goods; they just ignored the price limits. 
Farmers were involved in this equation because they bought goods from merchants, 
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and in turn sold their produce and goods in the towns where merchants lived.64 If 
farmers had to pay higher prices for imported goods, they felt the need to raise prices 
on their produce to maintain their own profit margins. It is unclear whether farmers 
had developed the same beliefs about the functioning of the economy as had 
merchants; what is clear is that the people of Boston believed farmers were also 
extorting the people. However, as farmers could not be found in the centre of Boston, 
they did not feel the town’s fury to the same extent. 
Boston’s merchants found themselves hitting the same limits of loyalty that 
potential soldiers were running into in this same period. Other members of society 
believed merchants’ obligations to the Patriot cause were set at a standard that 
merchants believed was unfeasible. The result was internal hostility, a crumbling 
economy, and significant hardship for the people of Boston.  
 
 
But soon elite opinion started to turn in favour of the merchants. This is likely 
because merchants were a significant part of Boston’s elite; therefore, they could 
easily express their opinions to prominent politicians, as Isaac Smith did to John 
Adams. It is also likely much of Boston’s elite had also had experience with the 
opening Atlantic economy, and lost contact with ideas of economic justice. Thus, they 
were already open to merchants’ arguments.65 Also, food riots were creating an 
unstable state of affairs while elites were trying to make laboring Bostonians join the 
continental army. This made elites nervous and soon wealthier Bostonians started to 
speak out against the legislation. John Adams, a safe three hundred miles away in 
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Philadelphia, expressed his opposition to the act as early as 6 April, in a letter to his 
wife Abigail, just two months after the bill was made law: 
The Act, my dear, that you were so fond of will do no good. 
Legislatures cannot effect Impossibilities. I detest all 
Embargoes, and all other Restraints upon Trade. Let it have 
its own Way, in such a Time as this and it will cure its own 
Diseases.66 
 
Adams’ claim was the strategy many wealthy Bostonians would use to put a 
dampener on the regulation; high prices were the result of the market and the 
currency, not individual people. Effectively, as Barbara Clark Smith notes, elite 
Bostonians tried to sever the connection between patriotism and prices in order to 
take the political ramifications out of the issue.67 Openly assisting the enemy was still 
Toryism; but wealthy patriots now wanted self-interest disassociated from supporting 
the British. Patriotism was being redefined in a way that suited the interests of 
wealthier patriots who benefitted from increased inter-state and international trade. 
The double standard in wanting the self-interest of the economic elite excused, while 
that of poorer Bostonians who refused to join the Continental army was not, did not 
occur to these patriots.  
The first time wealthier Bostonians publically questioned the Regulating Act was 
at a town meeting held on 22 May.68 Here it would appear merchants made a 
concerted effort to dominate the meeting, for there had been no talk against the act in 
the town meetings before this point. At this meeting there was a call for the act to be 
immediately repealed in the General Court. These instructions were given to Boston’s 
General Court representatives in a continuation of the same meeting on 26 May; 
these representatives were elected and re-elected on the 22nd, and as was customary 
a committee prepared a document of instructions for them. This was the justification 
for desiring the repeal of the Regulating act: 	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…they are (however well designed) a growing Source of 
Animosity & ill Will, tending to raise a Difference between 
Town & Country, at this – important Crisis, an Event ardently 
wished for by our Enemies, but ought to be guarded against 
with the utmost Caution by every Friend to his Country…69 
 
The five writers of this piece did not just try to separate prices and patriotism; they 
suggested that supporting the act helped the enemy. They went on to say that the 
acts in fact caused high prices because they were preventing the importing of goods, 
thus artificially lowering supply. 
… For it has been a known & acknowledged Truth, by all 
Nations, which were wise enough to encourage Commerce, 
that Trade must regulate itself; can never be clogged but to its 
ruin; & always flourishes when left alone…70 
 
 This was a new definition of what was Toryism and what was patriotic; 
patriotism was not supporting the community, but ensuring individual rights. Trying to 
restrict the economic rights of the individual and prevent free trade encouraged 
Toryism. Significantly, one of the five men who wrote this letter to the legislatures was 
John Winthrop, the same merchant who may have played the role of Joyce Junior 
only a month earlier in a Boston food riot. This may suggest that Winthrop had quickly 
found his antics could not quiet or control the crowds angered by high prices. Now he 
wanted to get rid of the law that caused unrest. He may have been indicative of the 
way many patriots very quickly changed their views on this issue when they realized 
where their interests lay.  
As had been the case in the pre-war stage of the conflict with Britain, crowds 
had made elite Bostonians nervous. However, in this instance elites realized that they 
did not need to tolerate the crowd, because they saw a new way of serving their own 
interests. They did not have the means to stop the crowd through force, but they 
could turn the law against them and try to take the sting out of crowd action by 
denying that the crowd was in the right. For some of Boston’s wealthier citizens, this 
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was another step away from a belief in economic fairness, and one more step toward 
economic liberalism.71 
When a vote was taken in the Massachusetts General Court on 16 June on 
whether to repeal the act, it was voted against by 121 to 31 votes. It may have been 
losing popularity amongst some wealthier parts of Boston, but price regulation still 
had support elsewhere in Massachusetts. Over the following few months though, 
those arguing against the regulations expressed their views frequently in both Boston 
newspapers.72 The arguments were fundamentally the same as those made in the 
May town meeting: the writers made the prices of goods into solely an economic, 
apolitical issue. High prices were the result of a weak, inflated currency, high demand, 
and high cost of imports. It was not a matter of virtue or patriotism. Meanwhile, social 
unrest continued amongst the lower sort of Boston, and elsewhere in Massachusetts, 
and there was no drop in prices.73 Eventually, the act was repealed in October 1777.74 
At the same time that patriot leaders attacked laboring Bostonians for being 
hesitant about serving in the army, they redefined patriotism so that their own actions 
could not be interpreted as Toryism. Over the first half of 1777, the patriot consensus 
that had temporarily united Bostonians against the British cracked significantly, if it did 
not break altogether. Elite patriots were trying to wrestle control of this new political 
order away from the laboring classes.  
Despite the move amongst the political and economic elite against price 
regulation, some Bostonians continued to defend the regulations by means other than 
rioting. ‘Z’ in the Chronicle of 12 June pleaded with the General Court to make sellers 
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take actual currency rather than barter with rum, salt, sugar and molasses.75 In the 26 
June edition of the same paper, ‘Amicus Patriae’ claimed to speak on behalf of the 
soldiers of America in asking for the General Court to keep the Regulating Act: 
…shall our wives and children starve at home, while our 
bodies become the bulwark of the States? Your regulating bill, 
we confess, inspired; thus we became the Publick’s. 
––THEN MAINTAIN YOUR WORD, WHILE WE DEFEND 
YOU. (Italics and capitals from source)76 
 
Before the end of the year, ‘A Dialogue between a Poor Widow and an Honest 
Farmer’ attacked the greed of farmers who attempted to benefit from the weakened 
currency.77 These people fought a losing battle in this instance, but these letters 
showed that not all had turned against regulation. There were to be more food riots in 
Boston during the latter part of 1777, and during 1778. The lack of an alternative 
measure for lessening hardship likely encouraged this. In particular, Amicus Patriae 
proved correct in his fears for the families of soldiers; in November 1777 it was 
reported to the town that nearly 500 people who had family members in the 
Continental army were suffering severe destitution.78 Wealthier Bostonians may have 
turned toward a belief in the economic rights of an individual as sacrosanct, but the 
laboring class still believed fairness and concern for community should outweigh 
individual profit. This issue had not yet been resolved. 
 
The town had worked itself up into a frenzied state, but it did not last. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, once again the catalyst was the enlistment issue. 
The rumoured return of the British in May inspired the filling of Boston’s quota, 
putting an end to that issue for the time being. A draft would not be necessary. The 
rhetoric about the virtue of the people ended around this time. Meanwhile, a 
Constitution drafting committee had been formed in June as part of the yearly 	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elections, but they were not to report back until January 1778.79 The elites who 
pushed for a more conservative approach hoped to wait out those with more radical 
ideas. This did not mean the issue went far from the hearts of the people, and it 
remained a controversial matter in the newspapers. In the Chronicle in July, a writer 
under the name of ‘Clitus’ caused controversy for several weeks when he suggested 
a form of constitution that was ‘easy, simple and cheap’.80 It involved a unicameral 
legislature, wide suffrage and a weak executive branch. ‘A Faithful Friend to His 
Country’ accused him of sowing internal discord and being prompted by ‘evil spirits’ a 
few weeks later.81 Passions could still run high when this issue was discussed, but 
with no new developments to comment on, it was put on pause for the most part. 
Attention was drawn from the virtue of the people by the loss of Ticonderoga in 
July 1777.82 This caused a great flurry of concern in the newspapers; a number of 
accounts were published disputing the condition of the soldiers, knowledge of 
conditions in the Fort, and the extent to which this loss endangered America.83 The 
newspapers even caught the attention of General St. Clair, who accused the 
publishers of both newspapers of printing lies in a letter that appeared in the 
Chronicle.84 He also attacked a prominent Chronicle writer who named himself 
Marcus Brutus. Brutus was outraged at the government’s running of the war, and 
saw Ticonderoga as a direct result of its incompetence.85 Brutus also wrote that it 
was not an appropriate time for the formation of a Constitution, because all attention 
needed to be focused on the war. The controversy of Ticonderoga raged on in both 
newspapers until victory at Saratoga in October.86 There was also another rumored 
invasion in August, of which Abigail Adams wrote: ‘We have never since the 	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Evacuation of Boston been under apprehensions of an invasion from them eaquel to 
what we suffered last week. All Boston was in confusion, packing up and carting out 
of Town, Household furniture, military stores, goods &c.’87 With concerns that their 
imminent safety was threatened, Bostonians become more worried about military 
matters than the virtue of the people and Toryism. The town meetings also reflected 
how attention had been drawn to matters outside of Boston and away from internal 
issues: only two meetings were held after July.88 
 
The Bostonian laboring classes had never been the playthings of the elite, and 
they displayed the extent of their independence in the two years after the siege. To 
ordinary Bostonians, patriotism was about the primacy of the community and its well 
being over all other considerations. They did not think in terms of an inter-state or 
national cause; other parts of America only existed in words. The elite of Boston did 
not understand this perspective, and do not seem to have tried to do so. At the same 
time, elite opinions on economic justice were changing, furthering the gap between 
them and laboring Bostonians. When it became clear that these divisions could be 
bad for elite interests, they began to move discourse around patriotism in a direction 
that suited them. There is no indication that the elite convinced the laboring classes to 
change their views on army enlistment and price regulation, at least not in the short 
term. But as elites held most of the power in Boston and Massachusetts at large, that 
hardly mattered in 1776-77. Boston did not move into its future a united community, 
but collapsed into the state of division that had dogged the town in the mid-eighteenth 
century.
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Conclusion 
 
Boston’s trials were not over with the close of 1777. The Constitution would not 
be ratified until 1780, and only then because the government and economy of 
Massachusetts was on the verge of collapse. Another failed attempt at price 
regulation would be made in 1779, this time alongside several other states. The 
town’s economic and population difficulties would only turn around, and slowly, with 
the end of the Revolutionary War.1 
Yet circumstances had changed by the end of 1777. The Revolutionary War 
moved south after the British defeat at Saratoga. Boston, already not seriously 
considered a military target by the American army, became even more distant from 
the war.2 Meanwhile, the controversies around army enlistment and price regulation 
signaled the direction of the Revolution in the years to come, in Boston and America 
more widely. Elites would increasingly wrest control of the discourse around 
patriotism. They would move its definition, and the focus of the Revolution, away 
from laboring class concerns and toward elite interests. To ensure their legitimacy 
while doing this, they demonized those who disagreed as Tories. Elites threw aside 
price regulation and embraced free trade. They would use the Massachusetts 
Constitution to limit democracy for the laboring classes. Crucial movements in 
Boston’s discourse can be seen in events in the town in the twenty-one months after 
the siege.3 	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Elite action in Boston in the late 1770s was ultimately reflective of the direction 
of the Revolution as a whole. Barbara Clark Smith sees the first ‘patriot consensus’ 
collapsing across America in this period; a second consensus, less amenable to 
laboring class interests, was formed in the 1780s.4 Gary Nash and Terry Bouton 
have argued that the Revolution was ‘tamed’ over the 1776–87 period, as 
conservative patriot elites claimed control and tried to sideline non-elites.5 They, and 
others, have contended that elite power over the Revolution culminated in the United 
States Constitution, a document intended to limit rather than ensure democracy.6 
   
With the benefit of hindsight, we now know that Boston pulled itself out of this 
difficult period. In spite of its physical state, low population, collapsed economy, 
wealth disparity, and social tensions, it remained a functioning town. However, even 
as it grew substantially bigger in the coming years, its slow decline in status was to 
continue.7 Yet in 1776-77 it would have been understandable if Bostonians saw its 
state as signifying the town’s final descent, after decades of troubles, into political and 
economic irrelevancy, social disorder and physical ruin. It was in no way clear that 
circumstances were going to improve; the Declaration of Independence was not the 
end of the story. The internal political, economic and social negotiations between 
different parts of the town, particularly those involving enlistments and price 
regulation, were drawn out and fraught with tension and setbacks. Its earlier 	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resistance and eventual recovery should not make historians underestimate the 
difficulty of this period in Boston’s history. 
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